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orders him to complete a Sexaholics Anonymous program or face 
incarceration.  Because he cannot stop asking other program 
members for sex, he fails the program.  Neuroimaging reveals a 
large brain tumor displacing part of the frontal lobe (and 
hypothalamus) of his brain.  After removal of the tumor, the 
deviant sexual behavior immediately ceases.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the above case.  The sudden and uncontrollable onset, 
and equally sudden cessation of criminal behavior, coincided with the 
presence or absence of an abnormality in the frontal lobes of the 
defendant’s brain.  This 1990 case is reminiscent of the celebrated 
1848 case of Phineas Gage, a railway foreman whose left frontal lobe 
was severely damaged when an explosion propelled a tamping iron 
through his head.2  The personality and behavior changes seen in 
Gage after the injury were dramatic.  “So radical was the change in 
him that friends and acquaintances could hardly recognize the 
man.”3  He became irritable and amoral, his social functioning 
declined significantly, and he frequently became involved in fights 
and drunken brawls.4  He thus exhibited some of the symptoms of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder.5 
Few cases, to be sure, are as stark.  But brain-damaged defendants 
are seen everyday in American courtrooms, and in many cases, their 
criminal behavior appears to be the product of extremely poor 
judgment and self-control.  Some have a disorder in the frontal lobes, 
the area of the brain responsible for judgment and impulse control.  
Individuals with frontal lobe disorder (hereinafter “FLD”) “become 
                                                 
 1. See Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with 
Pedophilia Symptoms and Constructional Apraxia Signs, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 437-
38 (2003) (describing a man whose uncontrollable sexual misbehavior returned to 
normal following resection of an orbitofrontal tumor).  The hypothalamus, in the 
orbitofrontal cortex of the brain, regulates sexual drives.  Id. at 438. 
 2. See generally MALCOLM MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME:  STORIES OF PHINEAS 
GAGE (2000). 
 3. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR:  EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN 8 (1994).  For a modern-day biographical account of the effects of frontal lobe 
brain damage, see CATHY CRIMMINS, WHERE IS THE MANGO PRINCESS? (2000). 
 4. See John Martyn Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod Through the Head, 39 BOSTON 
MED. & SURGICAL J. 389, 389-93 (1848) [hereinafter Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod 
Through the Head]; John M. Harlow, Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar Through the 
Head, 43 BOSTON MED. & SURG. J. 329, 339 (1868).  See generally MACMILLAN, supra 
note 2. 
 5. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS, § 301.7, at 701-06 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-
IV] (defining Antisocial Personality Disorder as “a pervasive pattern of, disregard for, 
and violation of, the rights of others,” often including criminal behavior, impulsivity, 
irritability or aggressiveness, and irresponsibility). 
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disinhibited. . . .  Their capacity to say to themselves, ‘Stop!  Don’t say 
or do that.  It is not wise,’ is damaged.”6  As one court explained, “due 
to the defendant’s brain impairment and problems with his frontal 
lobe functioning, the defendant had no judgment, in that he could 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct, but could not conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.”7 
Indeed, frontally-damaged individuals typically do not lack 
understanding, they lack behavioral control.  Not surprisingly, therefore, 
insanity defenses based on FLD are few in number and have not fared 
well. Because defendants suffering from FLD usually understand the 
difference between right and wrong, they are unable to avail 
themselves of the only insanity defense available in most states, a 
defense based on the McNaghten test.8  McNaghten is a narrow test that 
exculpates only defendants who did not understand the nature and 
consequences of their actions or that their criminal act was wrong.9  
“Irresistible impulse” (or “control”) tests, on the other hand, provide 
an insanity defense to those who committed a crime due to their 
inability to exercise behavioral control.  Control tests for insanity 
have fallen into disfavor, however, with less than one-third of the 
states currently employing a control test.10 
In this Article, I argue for a return to control tests for insanity, but 
with important doctrinal modifications.  The law must develop a 
“neurojurisprudence” that comports with modern neuroscience 
research on the role of brain dysfunction in impulsive criminal 
behavior.11  Control tests are needed to ensure that brain-disordered 
defendants have the opportunity to prove that they lacked criminal 
responsibility for the charged offense—a right that is essential, 
particularly in our system of retributive justice.  Defendants who 
substantially lack the physiological ability to control their criminal 
behavior should be allowed to present an insanity defense based on 
evidence of impaired impulse control. 
                                                 
 6. Jonathan H. Pincus, Aggression, Criminality, and the Frontal Lobes in THE HUMAN 
FRONTAL LOBES:  FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS 547, 549 (Bruce L. Miller & Jeffrey L. 
Cummings eds., 1999) [hereinafter Pincus, Aggression and Frontal Lobes] (noting 
frontal lobe involvement as the most prevalent type of brain involvement among 
“repeatedly violent individuals”). 
 7. Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 88 (Fla. 1999). 
 8. See McNaghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
 9. See id. at 719. 
 10. See infra Appendix B. 
 11. The term “neurojurisprudence” was coined by Professor Janet Weinstein and 
Dr. Ricardo Weinstein.  See Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, Neuro-Jurisprudence:  
The Brain and the Law, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY-LAW SOCIETY (March 2005) (symposium 
presented at annual meeting). 
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Part I of this Article provides a synthesis and review of 
neuroscience research on frontal lobe dysfunction as a causal factor 
in criminal behavior.  Then, following a brief discussion in Part II of 
the admissibility of FLD evidence, Part III presents the proposal for a 
return to control tests for insanity.  Opponents of control tests have 
offered, and continue to offer, three rationales for their 
abandonment:  (1) that cognitive tests for insanity are sufficient, 
since those with impaired impulse control will also be cognitively 
impaired;12 (2) that mental health professionals are incapable of 
reliably assessing the capacity for impulse control, particularly in 
relation to criminal behavior, or of differentiating between a truly 
irresistible impulse and an impulse that is merely difficult to resist;13 
and, therefore, that control tests lead to erroneous insanity 
acquittals;14 and, (3) that because “[they] directly pose the question 
of whether a person could control his or her behavior,”15 control tests 
run counter to the law’s assumption that people have free will and 
bear responsibility for their actions.16 As I demonstrate in Part III, 
current neuroscience research presents a challenge to these claims. 
I begin with an analysis of neuroscience research on the causal role 
of FLD in criminal behavior.  A compelling body of research 
demonstrates the reality of rationality in the absence of behavioral 
control in some defendants who suffer from frontal lobe dysfunction, 
providing the scientific foundation of my proposal for a return to 
control tests for insanity. 
I.  FRONTAL LOBE BRAIN DYSFUNCTION (“FLD”) AND CRIMINALITY 
“While nothing is easier than to denounce the evil doer, nothing is 
more difficult than to understand him.”17 
Philosophers and criminologists have, for centuries, speculated 
about the possible biological causes of crime.18  Biological 
                                                 
 12. See infra notes 248-56 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 283-298 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 239. 
 15. RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER  SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL 
HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 558 (4th ed. 2004). 
 16. See infra notes 336-43 and accompanying text. 
 17. Robert I. Simon, Should Forensic Psychiatrists Testify About Evil?, 31 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 413, 413 (2003) (quoting FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT (George Gibian ed., Jessie Coulson trans., 1964) (1866)). 
 18. See, e.g., GUSTAV ASCHAFFENBURG, CRIME AND ITS REPRESSION (Adalbert 
Albrecht trans., Little, Brown, and Co. 1913) (1903); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN:  
WITH SELECTED VARIANTS FROM THE LATIN EDITION OF 1668 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) 
(1651); CLAUDE ADRIAN HELVÉTIUS, ESSAYS ON THE MIND AND ITS SEVERAL FACULTIES 
(Burt Franklin, 1970) (1810); Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments in ON 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Ellamy ed., Richard Davies 
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explanations for crime date back to ancient times.  In 360 B.C., Plato 
wrote:  “For no man is voluntarily bad; but the bad becomes bad by 
reason of an ill disposition of the body . . . [which] happen[s] to him 
against his will.”19  Thus, “Plato may have been the first advocate of a 
disease theory of crime.”20  Centuries later, Victor Hugo predicted 
that crime eventually would be seen as a disease, because it is due to 
factors—including biology—outside the offender’s control.21  One of 
the best known proponents of biological explanations for criminality 
was the Italian physician Cesare Lombroso, whose writings during the 
Victorian period were influential in advancing the view that criminals 
had an innate disposition towards crime.22  Lombroso’s work led to 
the popularity of biological and psychological research on criminality 
in the United States,23 where a “naturalist” school of thought, which 
emphasized hereditary and biological explanations for crime, dates 
back to the late eighteenth century.24 
                                                 
& Virginia Cox trans., (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)) (1764); EMILE DURKHEIM, 
RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (Sarah Solovay, John H. Mueller & George E. G. 
Catlin eds. & trans., 8th ed., (Univ. Chicago Press 1938)) (1895); FRANZ JOSEF GALL, 
ON THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL QUALITIES AND INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF MAN AND 
THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR MANIFESTATION (Marsh, Capen & Lyon eds. & trans., 1835); 
FRANCIS GALTON, ESSAYS IN EUGENICS (1909); SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR GLUECK, 
500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930).  See generally David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the 
Criminal Law: A Rejoinder to Professor Morse, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1976); Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law:  Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a 
Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631 (2004); Clarence Darrow, Is Capital 
Punishment a Wise Policy?:  Debate With Judge Talley, in ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 89 
(Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957). 
 19. Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 633 (quoting Plato’s TIMAEUS, as translated in 
VICTOR GOLLANCZ, FROM DARKNESS TO LIGHT (1956) (internal citation omitted)). 
 20. Id. at 649 (citing MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION:  EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, 
LAW, AND LITERATURE 95 (1990)). 
 21. Id. at 631 (citing Victor Hugo, The Last Days of a Condemned, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY:  A LITERARY AND HISTORICAL APPROACH 103, 105 (Edward McGehee & 
William H. Hildebrand eds., 1964)) (“We shall look on crime as a disease, and its 
physicians shall displace the judges, its hospitals displace the galleys.  Liberty and 
health shall be alike.  We shall pour balm and oil where we formerly applied iron and 
fire; evil will be treated in charity, instead of in anger.”). 
 22. See CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME:  ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES (Henry P. Horton ed. 
& trans.) (Little Brown & Co. 1911) (1899); see also Marvin Wolfgang, Cesare Lombroso, 
1835-1909, in PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 232, 246-57 (Hermann Mannheim ed., 2d 
ed., Patterson Smith Publishing 1972) (1955) (describing Lombroso’s research into 
physical anomalies of criminals). 
 23. See Wolfgang, supra note 22, at 246-57; see also Thomas A. Green, Freedom and 
Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound:  An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1915, 1920-23 (1995) (stating that when early twentieth-century American 
criminologists began to apply behavioral science to the treatment of criminal 
offenders, they drew on the writings of late nineteenth-century European 
criminologists and penologists). 
 24. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:  SOCIAL ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN THE REPUBLIC 59-78 (1971). 
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Though criminal behavior seldom is due to any single biological, 
psychological, or sociological cause, we are closer to realizing the 
early criminologist’s dream of identifying the biological roots of 
criminality.25  Many neuroscientists and mental health professionals 
now refer to “crime as a disease,”26 the “psychopathology of crime,”27 
and “the neurobiology of violence.”28  A “‘biological brain-proneness’ 
toward violence is widely accepted by neuroscientists.”29 And, as one 
psychiatrist predicted, “we’re going to be able to diagnose many 
people who are biologically brain-prone to violence.”30  New brain 
imaging technologies allow us to “literally look at, and into, the 
                                                 
 25. See generally DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE:  HOW UNDERSTANDING 
THE BRAIN, BEHAVIOR, AND ENVIRONMENT CAN BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF 
AGGRESSION (1999); THE SCIENCE, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION OF ANTISOCIAL 
BEHAVIORS VOLUME 1:  APPLICATION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Diana H. 
Fishbein ed., 2000) [hereinafter ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS VOL. 1]; HANDBOOK OF 
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR (David M. Stoff, James Breiling & Jack D. Maser eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR]. 
A number of studies have found a genetic basis for antisocial and criminal 
behavior.  See generally H. Hill Goldsmith & Irving I. Gottesman, Heritable Variability 
and Variable Heritability in Developmental Psychopathology, in FRONTIERS OF 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 5 (Mark F. Lenzenweger & Jeffrey J. Haugaard 
eds., 1996); Peter McGuffin & Anita Thapar, Genetics and Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
in PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 215 (Theodore Millon 
et al. eds., 1998).  For example, a study of monozygotic twins reared apart found 
heritabilities for antisocial behavior ranging from .41 in childhood to .28 in 
adulthood.  William M. Grove et al., Heritability of Substance Abuse & Antisocial 
Behavior: A Study of Monozygotic Twins Reared Apart, 27 BIOLOGY PSYCHIATRY 1293 
(1990).  A large Danish study found that sixty-seven percent of the variability in 
crimes against persons and fifty percent of the variability in property crimes was 
attributable to genetic factors.  C.R. Cloninger & I. I. Gottesman, Genetic and 
Environmental Factors in Antisocial Behavior Disorders, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME: NEW 
BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 92 (Sarnoff A. Mednick, Terrie E. Moffitt & Susan A. Stack 
eds., 1987).  A study of juvenile offenders found that about thirty percent of the 
variability in aggression-based delinquency was explained by genetic factors.  See 
generally Lisabeth DiLalla & Irving I. Gottesman, Heterogeneity of Causes for Delinquency 
and Criminality, 1 DEVELOPMENT & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 339, 339 (1989). 
 26. See Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 631 (quoting Victor Hugo, The Last Days of a 
Condemned, in THE DEATH PENALTY:  A LITERARY AND HISTORICAL APPROACH 103, 105 
(Edward G. McGehee & William H. Hildebrand eds., 1964)). 
 27. ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME:  CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A 
CLINICAL DISORDER 3 (1993). 
 28. See, e.g., JAN VOLAVKA, NEUROBIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE (1995). 
 29. See Nathaniel J. Pallone & James J. Hennessy, Brain Dysfunction and Criminal 
Violence, 35 SOCIETY 21, 21 (1998). 
 30. Id. at 22 (quoting neuropsychiatrist Stuart Yudofsky); see also Christopher M. 
Filley et al., Toward an Understanding of Violence: Neurobehavioral Aspects of Unwarranted 
Physical Aggression: Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference Consensus Statement, 14 
NEUROPSYCHIATRY, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 1 (2001) (reporting 
conclusion of consensus group of experts, convened by the Brain Injury Association 
at the Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference, that the primary neurobehavioral causes 
of violence appear to be FLD, abnormal serotonin metabolism, and genetic factors). 
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brains of [criminals] using functional and structural imaging 
techniques.”31 
Indeed, neuropsychological studies show that the prevalence rate 
of brain dysfunction among criminal populations is extremely high, 
with prevalence rates of ninety-four percent among homicide 
offenders, sixty-one percent among habitually aggressive adults, forty-
nine to seventy-eight percent among sex offenders, and seventy-six 
percent among juvenile offenders32 (by comparison, the prevalence 
rate in the general population is only three percent).33  Clinical 
evaluations of death row inmates, for example, reveal that many have 
a history of head injury and serious neuropsychological deficits.34 
A.  Causes and Symptoms of FLD 
Frontal lobe brain dysfunction, in particular, has long been 
recognized as a possible causal factor in violent crime.35  As early as 
1835, medical case reports linked frontal lobe injury with violence.36 
But the exponential growth in neuroscience research over the last 
several decades provides compelling explanatory evidence that 
                                                 
 31. Adrian Raine, Psychopathy, Violence, and Brain Imaging, in VIOLENCE AND 
PSYCHOPATHY 35 (Adrian Raine & Jose Sanmartin eds., 2001). 
 32. Pallone & Hennessy, supra note 29, at 21.  However, the definition of “brain 
dysfunction” in these studies may include anything from mild deficits to major 
dysfunction. 
 33. The prevalence of mental disorders among persons with criminal justice 
system involvement is staggering.  See Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential to Teach 
About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How to Do It), 14 WASH. U. J. 
L. & POL’Y 407, 408-10 (2004) (reviewing data on the prevalence of mental disorders 
among adults who come into contact with the criminal justice system). 
 34. See, e.g., Pamela Y. Blake, Jonathan H. Pincus & Cary D. Buckner, Neurologic 
Abnormalities in Murderers, 45 NEUROLOGY 1641 (1995); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., 
Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in 
the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 838 (1986) [hereinafter Lewis et al., 15 
Death Row Inmates]; Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and 
Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 584, 584 (1988) [hereinafter Lewis et al., 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death].  
It should be noted, however, that these are not controlled studies but reports of 
clinical cases. 
 35. See generally Kurt Goldstein, The Mental Changes Due to Frontal Lobe Damage, 17 
J. PSYCHOL. 187 (1944); Montgomery C. Brower & Bruce H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of 
Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and Criminal Behaviour:  A Critical Review, 71 J. 
NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 720 (2001); Peter R. Giancola, 
Neuropsychological Functioning and Antisocial Behavior—Implications for Etiology and 
Prevention, in ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS VOL. 1, supra note 25; Bill Henry & Terrie E. 
Moffitt, Neuropsychological and Neuroimaging Studies of Juvenile Delinquency and Adult 
Criminal Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 25, at 280; Keith 
A. Hawkins & Krista K. Trobst, Frontal Lobe Dysfunction and Aggression: Conceptual Issues 
and Research Findings, 5 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 147 (2000); Alex B. Morgan & 
Scott O. Lilienfeld, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Relation Between Antisocial Behavior and 
Neuropsychological Measures of Executive Function, 20 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 113 (2000); 
Pincus, Aggression and Frontal Lobes, supra note 6. 
 36. See Brower & Price, supra note 35, at 720. 
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frontal lobe dysfunction may play a causal role in a wide variety of 
impulsive criminal behaviors.37 
Damage to the frontal lobes—the largest part of the brain—is the 
most common form of brain damage.  Each year, nearly one hundred 
thousand Americans sustain traumatic brain injuries (usually due to 
motor vehicle accidents, falls, sports injuries, and assaults) or brain 
tumors severe enough to damage the frontal lobes.38  Fifty to seventy-
six percent of motor vehicle accident victims show personality and 
mood changes due to frontal lobe injury,39 and even mild head 
injuries can cause frontal lobe damage.40  Substance abuse, relatively 
common among those who sustain traumatic brain injury, 
exacerbates the degree of brain damage.41  In childhood, physical 
abuse may result in injury to the frontal lobes,42 the part of the 
developing brain most sensitive to head injury.43 
                                                 
 37. See infra Part I.B. 
 38. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT 
ONLINE, Rehabilitation of Persons with Traumatic Brain Injury (1998), 
http://consensus.nih.gov/1998/1998TraumaticBrainInjury109html.htm; see also 
Robert T. Knight & Donald T. Stuss, Prefrontal Cortex:  The Present and the Future, in 
PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL LOBE FUNCTION 573, 587 (Robert T. Knight & Donald T. Stuss 
eds., 2002). 
 39. See, e.g., Erin D. Bigler, The Lesion(s) in Traumatic Brain Injury:  Implications for 
Clinical Neuropsychology, 16 ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 95 (2001) 
(assessing the pathophysiological impact of traumatic brain injury); Armin Schnider 
& Klemens Gutbrod, Traumatic Brain Injury, in THE HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES:  
FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS, supra note 6, at 498. 
 40. See R. Bart Sangal & JoAnne M. Sangal, Closed Head Injury Patients with Mild 
Cognitive Complaints without Neurological or Psychiatric Findings Have Abnormal Visual 
P300 Latencies, 39 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 305, 306 (1996) (finding abnormalities in 
seventy-five percent of patients with mild head injuries). 
 41. Harold V. Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology of Disorders of Executive 
Functions, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW 
APPLICATIONS 65 (Harold V. Hall & Robert J. Sbordone eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hall, 
Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology] (noting that violence can be the result of interaction 
between substance intoxication and frontal lobe deficits). 
 42. Yasuhiko Ito et al., Increased Prevalence of Electrophysiological Abnormalities in 
Children with Psychological, Physical, and Sexual Abuse, 5 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL 
NEUROSCIENCES  401, 401 (1993); James S. Grisolia, Neurobiology of the Psychopath, in 
VIOLENCE AND PSYCHOPATHY, 79, 83-85 (Adrian Raine & Jose Sanmartin eds., 2001); 
see also Harvey S. Levin et al., Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Relation to Functional 
Outcome of Pediatric Closed Head Injury:  A Test of the Ommaya-Gennarelli Mode, 40 
NEUROSURGERY 432, 438 (1997) (noting that brain lesions occur in about fifty-five 
percent of children and adolescents who sustain moderate head injuries and eighty-
one percent of those sustaining severe head injuries). 
 43. JONATHAN H. PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS:  WHAT MAKES KILLERS KILL?  85 (2001) 
[hereinafter PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS] (“The frontal lobes and executive functioning 
seem to be the most sensitive to the deleterious effects of all these causes of brain 
damage in young children.”); see also Grisolia, supra note 42, at 83-85 (observing that 
malnutrition can also retard frontal lobe development). 
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Frontal lobe brain damage often produces changes in personality, 
mood, and behavior,44 resulting in “frontal lobe dysfunction” or 
“frontal lobe syndrome,” a brain disorder recognized in the World 
Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases.45 In 
courtrooms, the terminology experts use to describe FLD 
symptomatology varies, including, inter alia, “frontal lobe 
syndrome,”46 “organic brain syndrome,”47 “frontal lobe brain 
damage,”48 a “deficiency in executive frontal lobe impairment,”49 and 
“impulse control disorder.”50 Common symptoms of FLD (see Table 1) 
include:  emotional lability (irritability, euphoria), deficits in self-
awareness, the inability to adjust behavior to changing circumstances, 
and decreased responsiveness to punishment.51  But deficits in 
planning and foresight, impaired social judgment, impulsivity, and 
behavioral disinhibition are the hallmarks of the disorder.52 
Table 1.  Symptoms Associated With Frontal Lobe Disorder 
Cognition 
Impaired temporal discrimination for recency and time span 
Defects in goal formulation 
Impaired ability to sustain attention 
Impaired ability to shift conceptual sets 
Difficulty in reversal of perspective 
Defects in planning behavior 
Spontaneous, florid confabulations with psychotic qualities 
Marked dissociation between verbalized intentions and actions 
Low creativity but may be maladaptively or primitively original 
(Overall intelligence as measured by IQ tests may not be impaired) 
 
Emotion 
Flat, blunt, or labile affect 
Violence occurring within background of flat affect 
                                                 
 44. D. Michael Bitz & Jean Seipp Bitz, Incompetence in the Brain Injured Individual, 
12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 205, 231-33 (1999). 
 45. INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES § 310.0 (“frontal lobe syndrome”) 
(10th ed. 2003). 
 46. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 752 N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2002). 
 49. See, e.g., Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 742 n.25 (Ind. 2001). 
 50. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 881 A.2d 669, 678 (Md. App 2005).  See generally 
Crook v. State, 908 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2005). 
 51. See Hawkins & Trobst, supra note 35, at 150-51; Antonio R. Damasio & Steven 
W. Anderson, The Frontal Lobes, in CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 404, 429-34 (Kenneth 
M. Heilman & Edward Velenstein eds., 4th ed. 2003). 
 52. Hawkins & Trobst, supra note 35, at 150-51. 
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Short-lived pleasure or pain 
Low frustration tolerance 
Shallow or inappropriate jocularity 
Inability to see the point in humorous pictures, anecdotes, cartoons, etc.  
Individual Behaviors 
Marked perseveration 
Impaired self-control 
Incompetent or ineffectual behavioral productions 
Impaired ability to modulate or fine-tune complex behavior 
Social Behaviors 
Marital or familial conflict centering around impairments 
Inability to obtain/maintain employment 
Low conformance to societal values/norms with no maliciousness intended 
Little spontaneous speech 
No maintenance of word flow, or difficulty turning off verbiage 
Inability to make appropriate shifts of “principle of action” (e.g., switching 
from attack to escape behaviors) 
Boastful, loud verbal productions 
Insensitivity towards others 
Sexual disinhibition 
Impaired ability to modulate emotional response during sustained social 
interaction 
 
Adapted from Harold V. Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology of 
Disorders of Executive Functions, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE 
FUNCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW APPLICATIONS 65 (Harold V. 
Hall & Robert J. Sbordone eds., 1998).  
 
“It is the job of the frontal lobes to focus attention and to modify 
and inhibit behavioral impulses that surge up from the other parts of 
the brain. . . .  Frontally damaged people often cannot keep their 
behavior within the general rules of society.”53  Thus, some persons 
with FLD show the patterns of behavioral responses associated with 
criminality.  In recent court cases involving evidence of frontal lobe 
dysfunction, expert testimony frequently explained the link between 
a defendant’s FLD and his or her criminal behavior.  Experts opined, 
and courts have concluded, for example, that: 
A person suffering from frontal lobe dysfunction could have an 
impairment in judgment, and could commit impulsive or violent 
                                                 
 53. PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS, supra note 43, at 217. 
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acts even though such acts normally would be against that person’s 
nature.54  
 
Defendant’s frontal lobe damage led to his inability to perceive 
social situations correctly and act accordingly, an inability to 
control his behavior, and an inability to act rationally during 
stressful situations.55 
[T]he circumstances of the crime were consistent with the experts’ 
diagnosis of frontal lobe brain damage. . . . [P]eople with frontal 
lobe brain damage often lose control over their own behavior and 
are prone to certain types of “rage” attacks as the frontal lobe works 
as a “braking mechanism for human behavior.”56 
[The defendant’s] impulse control is so tenuous, so hair triggered, 
impaired by his [frontal lobe] dementia, that he would have . . . 
flown into a rage at the time and not handled a situation [the way] 
that someone with more reasoning ability might have handled with 
considerably less force.57 
If it were not for the [brain] injury that [the defendant] sustained 
in 1980 he would not have committed this crime.  Prior to [his] 
accident in 1980 he had no behavioral problems.58 
[D]ue to the defendant’s brain impairment and problems with his 
frontal lobe functioning, the defendant had no judgment, in that 
he could appreciate the criminality  of his conduct, but could not 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.59 
Indeed, a recent meta-analysis60 of thirty-nine studies (totaling 
4,589 participants) concluded that persons who exhibit antisocial, 
criminal, or delinquent behavior perform significantly poorer than 
normal individuals on neuropsychological tests of the planning, 
decision making, self-monitoring, and judgment skills that reflect 
frontal-lobe functioning.61  Even minimal frontal lobe dysfunction 
                                                 
 54. See Commonwealth v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Mass. 1986). 
 55. See People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ill. 1999) (describing how the 
defendant presented affidavits as to his history of seizures and bizarre behavior, 
including violent episodes). 
 56. Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 71 (Fla. 2002). 
 57. State v. Stuard, 863 P.2d 881, 899 (Ariz. 1993). 
 58. Roberts v. State, 102 S.W.3d 482, 499 (Ark. 2003) (Thornton, J., dissenting). 
 59. Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 88 (Fla. 1999). 
 60. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique for aggregating and integrating results 
across studies.  See generally R. ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL 
RESEARCH (Rev. ed. 1991). 
 61. Though the relationship between antisocial behavior and executive deficits 
was substantial, with large average statistical effect sizes for criminality (1.09) and 
delinquency (.86), the meta-analysis likely underestimated the relationship between 
FLD and executive deficits because it did not focus on frontal lobe functioning.  See 
Morgan & Lilienfeld, supra note 35, at 113. 
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may cause impulsive aggression, as studies have found relationships 
between sub-clinical frontal lobe deficits and aggression in normal 
populations.62  And, in laboratory studies with animals, induced 
frontal lobe damage uniformly produces aggression toward other 
animals.63 
One of the most well known studies is the Vietnam Veterans Head 
Injury study.  It examined aggressive behavior in 279 veterans with 
frontal lobe lesions as compared to a matched control group of 57 
non-injured veterans.  The brain-injured veterans were reported by 
family and friends to be significantly more aggressive; twenty percent 
became aggressive after their injury and fourteen percent were 
violent.64  Similarly, a study of prison inmates found that violent 
crimes were committed by seventy-three percent of the brain-
damaged inmates but by only twenty-eight percent of the non-injured 
inmates,65 and Professor Lewis’ clinical case studies of eighteen 
inmates on death row in Texas revealed that fifteen displayed 
symptoms of FLD on neuropsychological tests.66 
Brain imaging studies have consistently revealed structural and 
functional abnormalities in the frontal lobes of violent and 
psychopathic individuals.67  Professor Adrian Raine and colleagues 
found that murderers showed less frontal lobe activity, as measured 
by Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”) scans, than did matched 
control subjects68 and that men with antisocial personality disorder 
had, on average, eleven percent less gray matter in the frontal lobes 
of their brains.69  Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) scans of a 
                                                 
 62. Hawkins and Trobst, supra note 35, at 156. 
 63. See generally Pallone & Hennessy, supra note 29. 
 64. Jordan Grafman et al., Frontal Lobe Injuries, Violence, and Aggression:  A Report of 
the Vietnam Head Injury Study, 46 NEUROLOGY 1231 (1996). 
 65. Ernest T. Bryant, Monte L. Scott & Charles J. Golden, Neuropsychological 
Deficits, Learning Disability, and Violent Behavior, 52 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
323, 323 (1984). 
 66. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Ethics Questions Raised by the Neuropsychiatric, 
Neuropsychological, Educational, Developmental, and Family Characteristics of 18 Juveniles 
Awaiting Execution in Texas, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 408, 414-18 (2004) 
[hereinafter Lewis et al., Ethics Questions].  It should be noted, however, that this was 
not a controlled study. 
 67. Henry & Moffitt, supra note 35, at 280; Adrian Raine & Monte S. Buchsbaum, 
Violence and Brain Imaging, in NEUROBIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CLINICAL AGGRESSION 
RESEARCH 195 (David M. Stoff & Robert B. Cairns eds., 1996).   
 68. See Adrian Raine et al., Selective Reductions in Pre-Frontal Glucose Metabolism in 
Murderers, 36 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 365-66 (1994) (finding that low glucose 
metabolism in both the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex may be related to a 
person’s propensity for violence). 
 69. Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced 
Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119, 
123  (2000). 
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community sample of men diagnosed with antisocial personality 
disorder as compared to substance dependent and normal male 
control groups, showed that the antisocial men had significantly 
lower volumes of prefrontal gray matter, with the most psychopathic 
men having the lowest volumes of prefrontal gray matter.70  Another 
study comparing predatory murderers with “affective” murderers 
found that although both groups had excessive activity in the 
subcortex (including the amygdala and hippocampus), which may 
explain their aggressive temperament, only the affective murderers 
had abnormal functioning in the frontal lobes, which may account 
for their impulsive killings.71 
Although such neuroimaging studies are often referenced as 
persuasive evidence for the role of FLD in violent behavior, a note of 
caution must be sounded.  These studies, still relatively few in 
number, often include only a small number of subjects, lack control 
groups, or find “considerable overlap between the values of patient 
and control groups in studies of the size, shape, or metabolic activity 
of different brain regions.”72  Moreover, to date, there are no 
standard criteria available for differentiating between normal and 
abnormal scan results or for quantifying the extent of brain damage.73 
In adolescence, frontal lobe dysfunction may lead to delinquent 
behavior74 by producing behavioral disinhibition, a key predictor 
distinguishing between “adolescence-limited” and “life-course 
                                                 
 70. See Adrian Raine et al., Prefrontal Glucose Deficits in Murderers Lacking 
Psychosocial Deprivation, 11 NEUROPSYCHIATRY, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 
NEUROLOGY 1, 5  (1998) (noting that prefrontal dysfunction is hard to attribute to 
factors such as physical abuse or socioeconomic deprivation). 
 71. Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain 
Functioning Assessed Using Positron Emission Tomography in Predatory and Affective 
Murderers, 16 BEHAV. SCI. &  L. 319, 327-28 (1998) (hypothesizing that murderers who 
commit impulsive murders are more likely to have deficient prefrontal regulation); 
see also Raine et al.,  supra note 68 (examining the effect of low prefrontal glucose 
levels in murderers). 
 72. Jennifer Kulynych, Comment, Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior:  Neuroimages 
as Scientific Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 239 (1996) [hereinafter Kulynych, 
Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence]; see also Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome 
and Criminal Responsibility:  A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 399-400 
(2006) [hereinafter Morse, Brain Overclaim] (criticizing the tendency of people to 
use advances in neuroscience to arrive at moral and legal conclusions). 
 73. See Kulynych, Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, supra note 72, at 238-40. See 
generally Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence:  A High-Tech 
Crystal Ball, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1996-97) [hereinafter Kulynych, High-Tech Crystal 
Ball] (discussing the evidentiary issues relating to the admission of neuroimages into 
evidence). 
 74. See Terrie E. Moffitt & Simonne A. Silva, Neuropsychological Deficit and Self-
Reported Delinquency in an Unselected Birth Cohort, 27 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 233, 233 (1988) (hypothesizing that some indicators of 
cognitive deficit may be linked to delinquent behavior). 
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persistent” offenders.75  Roughly twenty percent of juvenile offenders 
have Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), a primary 
risk factor for delinquency.76  Studies suggest that ADHD, a disorder 
characterized by deficits in attention allocation, self-monitoring, and 
impulse control, may be due to diffuse frontal lobe dysfunction.77  In 
his clinical evaluations of death row inmates, Professor Jonathan 
Pincus found78 that many had been victims of child abuse, had 
sustained traumatic brain injuries in childhood, and had been dually 
diagnosed with ADHD and conduct disorder.79 
Even without any damage, however, the frontal lobes of adolescents 
are underdeveloped as compared to adults.  Recent longitudinal 
neuroimaging studies show that the frontal lobes are the last part of 
the brain to reach maturity.  One recent neuroimaging study, for 
example, found less brain activity in the frontal lobes of seventeen-
year-olds as compared to adults when completing a laboratory task 
requiring them to identify the emotions of others in facial 
photographs, although their amygdala was fully activated to alert the 
adolescents that the images were important.  The adolescents also 
were less accurate in their assessments.80  Frontal lobe development 
during adolescence includes gray matter thinning, increases in white 
matter, and neuronal myelination and pruning.  The greatest 
maturation occurs between the ages of sixteen and twenty, though 
                                                 
 75. See Helene Raskin White, Marsha E. Bates & Steven Buyske, Adolescence-Limited 
Versus Persistent Delinquency:  Extending Moffitt’s Hypothesis Into Adulthood, 110 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 600, 601 (2001) (explaining that adolescent-limited delinquents 
will not continue to offend into adulthood). 
 76. See Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein, Oluseyi Olubadewo, Richard E. Redding & 
Frances J. Lexcen, Mental Health Disorders:  The Neglected Risk Factor in Delinquency, in 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:  PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 92-93 (Kirk 
Heilbrun, Naomi Goldstein & Richard Redding eds., 2005) (noting that ADHD can 
impair cognitive abilities which may intensify behavioral problems). 
 77. See Pincus, Aggression and Frontal Lobes, supra note 6, at 554-55; Carole 
Samango-Sprouse, Frontal Lobe Development in Childhood, in THE HUMAN FRONTAL 
LOBES:  FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS 584, 597-98 (Bruce L. Miller & Jeffrey L. 
Cummings eds., 1999). 
 78. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 93 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL] (defining Conduct Disorder as a disorder of childhood and adolescence 
where “a repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of 
others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated”).  Conduct 
disorder is often the precursor to adult Antisocial Personality Disorder.  Id. at 94. 
 79. See Pincus, Aggression and Frontal Lobes, supra note 6, at 554-55 (finding that 
most of the individuals with frontal lobe damage who were on death row sustained 
brain damage in their infancy). 
 80. See Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect 
Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (1999) (noting that all of the adolescents exhibited a marked 
increase in amygdala activity during facial expression recognition exercises). 
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maturation is not complete until the early twenties.81  Adolescents’ 
frontal lobe immaturity contributes to their psychosocial immaturity, 
including their impulsivity, risk taking behavior, and vulnerability to 
peer pressure, all of which are risk factors for delinquent behavior.82  
Some juvenile offenders additionally suffer from frontal lobe 
dysfunction (often due to child abuse),83 thus exacerbating the 
psychosocial immaturity typical of adolescent brain immaturity. A 
study comparing physically aggressive and nonaggressive boys found 
signs of FLD only in the aggressive boys.84  “[S]uch impaired youths 
may possess a theoretical understanding of right and wrong and still 
lack the capacity to reflect on and manage their aggressive feelings.”85 
Yet, while the prevalence rate of violence among those with frontal 
lobe dysfunction is ten percent higher than that found among the 
general population,86 most adolescents and adults who suffer from 
FLD are never criminally violent.87  Professor Pincus notes that those 
who become violent frequently have a co-existing psychiatric disorder 
with paranoid features and a history of abuse in childhood (a typical 
pattern found among inmates on death row).  “With frontal [lobe] 
injury, individuals become disinhibited. . . . Their capacity to say to 
themselves, “Stop!  Don’t say or do that.  It is not wise,” is damaged.  
In people whose instincts are benign, this may not be socially 
                                                 
 81. See John Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence:  A 
Longitudinal MRI study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 862 (1999) (demonstrating 
nonlinear changes in cortigal gray matter, as opposed to the linear changes the 
scientific community previously hypothesized); see also Niten Gogtay et al., Dynamic 
Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8174, 8175-76 (2004) (reporting that cortical gray matter 
development continues until at least age twenty-one). 
 82. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal 
Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 230 (1995) (noting that adolescents take more 
risks in areas of health and safety than adults, but are not less likely to risk 
consequences such as social ostracism); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Relevance 
of Brain Research to Juvenile Defense, CRIM. JUST. 51, 51 (2005) (“These characteristics 
are built in—literally hard-wired into the adolescent brain—and are not aberrant 
symptoms of moral weakness.”). 
 83. See Lewis et al., Ethics Questions, supra note 66, at 426-27 (noting that in 
addition to damaging to the frontal lobes, the chronic stress of child abuse also has 
long-term negative effects on brain chemistry (by increasing the levels of 
glucocorticoid and noradrenaline response to stressors), resulting in hyper-vigilance 
and increased sensitivity to threat).  See generally JAMES BLAIR, DEREK MITCHELL & 
KARINA BLAIR, THE PSYCHOPATH:  EMOTION AND BRAIN 102-03 (2005).  
 84. J. R. Sequin et al., Cognitive and Neuropsychological Characteristics of Physically 
Aggressive Boys, 104 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 614, 615 (1995) (studying the differences 
in cognitive function between six to twelve-year-old boys with a history of physical 
aggression and without a history of physical aggression). 
 85. Lewis et al., Ethics Questions, supra note 66, at 427. 
 86. Brower & Price, supra note 35, at 725. 
 87. See id. (“The actual frequency of violent behavior, however, seems relatively 
low.”). 
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dangerous.  It is our contention that in the abused and paranoid, 
frontal damage is like letting a lion out of his cage.”88  Substance 
abuse, common among those with FLD, further increases the risk for 
violence, just as it does for those with other mental disorders.89  
Individuals with extensive frontal lobe damage may develop episodic 
dyscontrol characterized by rage attacks in response to minimal 
provocation, which may be triggered by even small amounts of 
alcohol.  The dyscontrol may lead to unplanned homicide, assaults, 
spousal and child abuse, reckless driving, and property destruction.90 
Although FLD is more closely associated with reactive-violent and 
impulsive crimes, FLD may be a contributing factor in almost any 
type of crime, given the pervasive effects of FLD on cognition, affect, 
and behavior.  (Professors Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson’s 
influential “unified theory of crime” suggests poor impulsive control 
to be the genesis of much criminal behavior.)91  A study of even non-
violent offenders living in the community found that fifty percent had 
sustained a head injury.92  Frontal lobe dysfunction can contribute to 
crime in unexpected ways, as demonstrated by the first recently-
published report of stalking behavior and erotomania due to an 
arteriovenous malformation in the person’s frontal lobe.93 
                                                 
 88. Pincus, Aggression and Frontal Lobes, supra note 6, at 549. 
 89. See id. at 550 (“Often, alcohol or drugs contribute to wild, rageful 
overkilling.”); see also Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Likelihood of Future Violence in 
Individuals with Mental Illness:  Current Knowledge and Future Issues, 13 J. L. & POL’Y 629, 
630, 636-37 (2005) (concluding, based on a review of the empirical literature, that 
while mental illness is a modest risk factor for violence, the combination of mental 
illness and substance abuse substantially increases the risk of violence); Jeffrey 
Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community:  Evidence from 
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761, 768-69 
(1990) (reporting that twenty-one percent of individuals with a substance abuse 
problem had a history of violence); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UNDERSTANDING 
AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 185 (A. Reiss & J. Roth eds., 1993) (reporting on studies 
showing that about one-third of violent offenders are alcoholics). 
 90. Frank A. Elliott, Neurology of Aggression and Episodic Dysfunction, 10 SEMINARS IN 
NEUROLOGY 303, 307 (1990). 
 91. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 
85-120 (1990) (asserting that criminal acts provide immediate gratification, and 
often the gratification is not pleasure but relief from irritation). 
 92. Michael Sarapata et al., The Role of Head Injury in Cognitive Functioning, 
Emotional Adjustment and Criminal Behavior, 12 BRAIN INJURY 821, 833 (1998) (noting 
that head injuries are potentially a contributing factor to a person’s engagement in 
criminal activity). 
 93. See Frank R. Farnham et al., Pathology of Love, 350 THE LANCET J. 710, 710 
(1997) (emphasizing that clinicians should consider the possibility that an offender’s 
behavior is the result of an underlying pathology). 
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B. The Role of FLD in Criminal Behavior 
[If the criminal] law stood on the moral grounds which are 
proposed for it [we would have to consider] those limitations in the 
capacity for choosing rightly which arise from abnormal instincts, 
want of education, lack of intelligence, and all the other defects 
which are most marked in the criminal classes. 
(Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1881)94 
Modern research on FLD probably began in 1949,95 when 
neurology Professors Ackerly and Benton reported on the case of 
“JP,” in a classic set of papers.96  JP had a normal IQ and his school 
performance was average.  A pneumoencephalogram, however, 
revealed that a substantial portion of his frontal lobes were missing or 
had been destroyed.97  Ackerly and Benton, who followed JP from the 
time he was nineteen years of age until he reached fifty, observed that 
his life was “a semblance of normality.”98  He was very polite and, in 
some ways, interpersonally “impressive.”99  Remarkable, however, was 
JP’s lack of self-reflection and insight, his erratic and impulsive 
behavior, and his almost complete inability to learn from punishment 
or negative experiences.100  He was so present-oriented that it 
“isolate[d] him from the mainstream of human events.”101  Since his 
youth, JP had frequently been involved in petty crime, particularly 
impulsive thefts.102 
The link between FLD and criminal behavior is not surprising 
when considering the functions of the frontal lobes, the so-called 
“theater of the mind,”103 responsible for the executive brain functions 
of attention allocation, planning, decision making, judgment, 
                                                 
 94. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 45 (39th printing 1946) 
(1881). 
 95. Elissa Ely, The Physiology of Insight, 12 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 9 (1995), available at 
http://psychiatrictimes.com/p950929.html (noting that modern frontal lobe 
research began with the work of S.S. Ackerly and Arthur Benton). 
 96. See S. Spafford Ackerly, A Case of Perinatal Bilateral Frontal Lobe Defect Observed 
for Thirty Years, in THE FRONTAL GRANULAR CORTEX AND BEHAVIOR 192 (J.M. Warren & 
K. Akert eds., 1964) (presenting the findings of a study of a subject with “bilateral 
frontal lobe disease”). 
 97. Id. at 196-98. 
 98. Id. at 192. 
 99. Id. at 195. 
 100. See id. at 198-206, 213-14 (noting that the subject’s social development was 
comparatively the most arrested aspect of his development). 
 101. Id. at 213-14. 
 102. See id. at 198 (noting that the subject’s impulsive thievery became a pattern). 
 103. See Terence W. Picton, Claude Alain & Anthony R. McIntosh, The Theatre of 
the Mind:  Physiological Studies of the Human Frontal Lobes, in PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL 
LOBE FUNCTION 109 (Donald T. Stuss & Robert T. Knight eds., 2002) (noting that the 
frontal lobes allow humans to learn from experiences and understand the principle 
of cause and effect). 
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behavioral monitoring, and impulse control.104  Although people with 
frontal lobe damage usually retain their overall intellectual capacities 
and can reason rationally about social and moral situations, they 
frequently behave “in a most unintelligent way.”105  Their real-world 
judgment is impaired.106  The impaired impulse control reflects “a 
curious dissociation between knowing and doing . . . . Frontal lobe 
patients know their errors, but are unable to use that knowledge to 
modify [their] behavior.”107 
Frontal lobe dysfunction comes in at least two distinct forms, 
depending upon the location of the frontal lobe damage.  One form 
(involving damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) produces 
impulsivity108 and impulsive aggression, while the other form 
(involving damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) impairs 
judgment and moral reasoning.109  However, since most brain injuries 
and illnesses causing substantial injury to the frontal lobes have 
                                                 
 104. See id. (noting that the frontal lobes perform these functions through 
“representational processing”); see also Donald T. Stuss & D. Frank Benson, 
Neuropsychological Studies of the Frontal Lobes, 95 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3 (1984) (“In 1928, 
the American neurologist Tilney suggested that the entire period of human 
evolutionary existence could be considered the ‘age of the frontal lobe.’”). 
 105. Damasio & Anderson, supra note 51, at 415. 
 106. See Raymond J. Dolan, On the Neurology of Morals, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 927 
(1999) (noting that social abilities are generally severely impaired in persons with 
frontal lobe damage).  See generally Antoine Bechara et al., Poor Judgment in Spite of 
High Intellect: Neurological Evidence for Emotional Intelligence, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 192 (Reuven Bar-On & James D.A. Parker eds., 2000); 
Daniel T. Tranel, “Acquired Sociopathy”:  The Development of Sociopathic Behavior 
Following Focal Brain Damage, 17 PROGRESS IN EXPERIMENTAL PERSONALITY AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY RESEARCH 285, 290 (1994) [hereinafter Tranel, Acquired Sociopathy] 
(noting that patients with frontal lobe damage tend to show “callous unconcern, 
boastfulness, and unrestrained and tactless behavior”).  Individuals with FLD often 
score in the normal range on IQ tests.  But they frequently have difficulty with real-
life problem solving, which requires an evaluation of multiple competing options in 
social contexts and decision making under stressful conditions.  Brower & Price, 
supra note 35, at 721.   
 107. Stuss & Benson, supra note 104, at 18. 
 108. See F. Gerald Moeller et al., Psychiatric Aspects of Impulsivity, 158 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1783, 1783 (2001) (defining impulsivity as an individual’s “predisposition 
toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external stimuli without regard to 
the negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive individual or to 
others”). 
 109. See M. Allison Cato, Dean C. Delis, Tracy J. Abildskov & Erin Bigler, Assessing 
the Elusive Cognitive Deficits Associated with Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage: A Case of a 
Modern-Day Phineas Gage, 10 J. INT’L.= NEUROLOGICAL SOC. 453, 454 (2004) 
(concluding that the cognitive deficits resulting from prefrontal lobe damage may be 
greater than previously believed); see also Daniel Tranel, Emotion, Decision Making, and 
the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, in PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL LOBE FUNCTION 338 (D. T. 
Stuss & R.T. Knight eds., 2002) [hereinafter Tranel, Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex] 
(examining the effect frontal lobe injury has on a person’s ability to use emotions to 
guide their decision-making); Jorge Moll et al., The Neural Basis of Human Moral 
Cognition, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 799, 799-800 (2005) (examining the link 
between brain dysfunction and social behavioral impairments). 
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widespread effects,110 it is not uncommon to find both forms present, 
though one form may predominate.111  Thus, this Article discusses 
both forms of FLD, but focuses on the type that affects impulse 
control, since it is central to my proposal to revive control tests for 
insanity. 
In the form of FLD that causes impulsive behavior, there is a 
disruption in the neural circuit running between the limbic system 
(especially the amygdala) and the frontal lobes, which is a brain 
circuit responsible for fear conditioning, stress responses, mood 
regulation, and impulse control,112 and “the meeting point between 
thought and emotion.”113  The amygdala, which stores emotional 
memories of past experiences and compares incoming stimuli against 
those stored memories, is responsible for the rapid evaluation of 
incoming perceptual stimuli.114  This evaluation occurs automatically 
and outside of conscious awareness.115  The amygdala is “something 
like a psychological sentinel, challenging every situation, every 
perception . . . Is this something I hate?  That hurts me?  Something I fear?  
If so . . . the amygdala reacts instantaneously, like a neural tripwire, 
telegraphing a message of crisis to all parts of the brain”116 and 
                                                 
 110. See Stuss & Benson, supra note 104, at 6, 23 (“[B]rain injury is never totally 
focal . . . the frontal lobes are only infrequently disturbed individually.”). 
 111. See id. at 3 (“[T]he term frontal lobe syndrome is used to refer to an amorphous, 
varied group of deficits, resulting from diverse etiologies, different locations, and 
variable extents of abnormalities.”).  Professor Pincus equates the varied symptoms of 
FLD with drunkenness:  some individuals are irritable, moody, and violent, while 
others are relatively calm, sad, and apathetic.  See PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS, supra note 
43, at 217 (adding that people with frontal lobe damage who also have psychiatric 
disorders that cause mood swings often find their mood swings exacerbated). 
 112. See Ralph Adolphs, Neural Systems for Recognizing Emotion, 12 CURRENT OPINION 
IN NEUROBIOLOGY 299 (2002) (listing the numerous brain structures that aid a 
person’s facial recognition ability).  See generally Skye McDonald & Sharon Flanagan, 
Social Perception Deficits After Traumatic Brain Injury:  Interaction Between Emotion 
Recognition, Mentalizing Ability, and Social Communication, 18 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY J. 572 
(2004); Raine, supra note 31, at 49-50; Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology, supra 
note 41, at 41. 
 113. DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE:  WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN 
IQ 28 (1994). 
 114. See F.C. Murphy, I. Nimmo-Smith & A.D. Lawrence, Functional Neuroanatomy 
of Emotions:  A Meta-Analysis, 3 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 
207, 207 (2003) (finding that the emotions of anger, fear and disgust were 
consistently associated with activity in the amygdala, among other brain areas). 
 115. Ralph Adolphs, Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behavior, 4 NATURE REVS. 
NEUROSCIENCE 165, 169 (2003) [hereinafter Cognitive Neuroscience] (“The bulk of 
research on the human amygdala has used emotional facial expressions as stimuli 
and has pointed most consistently to this region being involved in the processing of 
fear and related emotions.”). 
 116. GOLEMAN, supra note 113, at 16. 
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autonomic nervous system, triggering the secretion of epinephrine 
and norepinephrine.117 
“[T]he amydgala proposes, the prefrontal lobe disposes . . . .  The 
connections between the amygdala (and related limbic structures) 
and the [frontal lobes] are the hub of the battles or cooperative 
treaties struck between head and heart, thought and feeling.”118  
Analogizing to classic Freudian terms, one could conceptualize the 
frontal lobes as serving the functions of the Ego, which keeps in check 
the primitive drives and emotions of the Id.119  Normally, the frontal 
lobes act as a circuit breaker for the reactive emotional responses 
generated by the amygdala.  But the circuit breaker may fail when the 
frontal lobes are damaged.  Frontally-damaged individuals may be 
unable to inhibit quick response reactions generated by the amygdala 
or to judge the consequences of an aggressive response,120 particularly 
in stressful or provocative circumstances.121  In many circumstances, 
the frontal lobes of the brain engage a stimulus at roughly the same 
time as the amygdala, producing a coordinated response that 
integrates emotional perceptions with rational decision making.  But 
particularly in threatening or emotionally-charged situations, the 
amygdala’s evaluation and response occurs before the higher 
cognitive processes in the frontal lobes can become fully engaged to 
rationally analyze the situation.122 
Recall the 1848 Phineas Gage case, described at the beginning of 
this Article.123  Gage’s physician described his post-injury functioning 
thusly: 
The equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual 
faculties and animal propensities seems to have been destroyed.  
                                                 
 117. Id. at 16, 20. 
 118. Id. at 26-27. 
 119. I am indebted to Professor Michael Williams for this analogy. 
 120. See generally BLAIR, MITCHELL, & BLAIR, supra note 83, at 96-101 (describing the 
neurocognitive physiology of reactive aggression). 
 121. See Richard J. Davidson, Katherine M. Putnam & Christine L. Larson, 
Dysfunction in the Neural Circuitry of Emotion Regulation—A Possible Prelude to Violence, 
289 SCIENCE 591, 591-92  (2000). 
 122. See Adam K. Anderson, Kalina Christoff, David Panitz, Eve De Rosa & John D. 
Gabrieli, Neural Correlates of the Automatic Processing of Threat Facial Signals, 23 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 5,627 (2003).  See generally J.E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE 
MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996); J.S. Morris, A. Ohman & R.J. 
Dolan, Conscious and Unconscious Emotional Learning in the Human Amygdala, 393 
NATURE 467, 468-70 (1998); J.S. Morris, A. Ohman & R.J. Dolan, A Subcortical Pathway 
to the Right Amygdala Mediating “Unseen” Fear, 96 PROCEED. NAT. ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1680, 
1682-84(1999); Paul J. Whalen et al., Masked Presentations of Emotional Facial Expressions 
Modulate Amygdala Activity without Explicit Knowledge, 18 J. NEUROSCIENCE 411, 411 
(1998). 
 123. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text; see also Cato et al., supra note 109. 
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He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity, 
manifesting but little defense for his fellows, impatient of restraint 
or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously 
obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans of 
operation, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned 
in turn for others appearing more feasible . . . [P]revious to his 
injury . . . he possessed a well-balanced mind . . . [I]n this regard 
his mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and 
acquaintances said he was “no longer Gage.”124 
Consider the behavior of two young adults who sustained severe 
frontal lobe damage in infancy or early childhood.125 G.K., who 
sustained brain damage at birth: 
did not respond to parental discipline [and] always sought 
gratification of his immediate needs . . . . [He has been] 
imprisoned 8 times on charges of assault, forgery (using his father’s 
cheque book), grand larceny, drug involvement and lewd 
behaviour.  Inappropriate behaviours were numerous.  While 
walking by a gas station he saw an unattended taxi with keys in the 
ignition.  He jumped in and drove off, ripping the hose from the 
gas pump, only to be captured several blocks away.126 
After sustaining frontal lobe damage at age four, M.H.: 
became verbally and physically assaultive in an abrupt, 
unpredictable, and short-lived manner.  She hit her brother, threw 
her father over a table, and cut her sister with glass.  Family 
members lived in constant terror and once called the police when 
she threatened them at knife point . . . since her early teens, she 
was known for her sexual promiscuity and bravado.  She 
intermittently engaged in heavy alcohol and marijuana use.  She 
had no sustained friendships.127 
“Both patients displayed impulsive behavior triggered by the 
immediate stimulus, performed with childish abandon and shallow 
foresight.  Neither was able to learn from negative experience or 
punishment.”128  They lacked “the physiology of insight.”129 
In some frontally-damaged individuals, the impulsivity and 
emotional reactivity reflects “environmental dependency 
syndrome”—a “powerless[ness] in the face of influences from the 
                                                 
 124. Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod Through the Head, supra note 4, at 339-40. 
 125. See Bruce H. Price et al., The Comportmental Learning Disabilities of Early Frontal 
Lobe Damage, 113 BRAIN 1383, 1383 (1990) (finding arrested development in two 
subjects who both suffered prefrontal lobe damage). 
 126. Id. at 1384. 
 127. Id. at 1385. 
 128. Id. at 1389. 
 129. Id. 
REDDING.OFFTOPRINTER 9/18/2006  1:18:17 PM 
72 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1 
outside world”130—due to a loss in the frontal lobes’ ability to inhibit 
activity in the parietal lobes of the brain.131  As Dr. Ely explains: 
[Frontal lobe patients] become perpetually responsive and literally 
overstimulated.  They have lost the capacity to ignore their 
environment even when the response seems bizarre or 
inappropriate . . . . When the frontal lobes are no longer in 
command . . . [w]e do not live reflectively, but reflexively . . . . It’s a 
sudden collapse of behavioral control.  You can have a conversation 
with a man, a good and pleasant conversation.  The next day, he 
steals his father’s credit card, buys a luxury piece of equipment, 
and gives it away to the first person he meets.132 
Professor Damasio’s somatic marker theory133 provides a cogent 
explanation for the extremely poor judgment and inability to learn 
from experience often seen in those with FLD.  Frontal lobe 
dysfunction (when due to damage in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex) is thought to impair the emotional or somatic marking of 
stimuli linked to reward and punishment, which guides people in 
using past experience to anticipate the future consequences of their 
behavior.134  The “emotional value laden encoding of information is 
necessary for rationality,”135 allowing us to appreciate the positive and 
negative attributes of situations and decisions, to learn from and be 
responsive to reward and punishment, and to make quick but sound 
judgments about the most appropriate behavioral responses.136 The 
extant behavioral and physiological evidence, though limited, 
provides support for the somatic marker theory.137  For example, 
                                                 
 130. See Francois L’Hermitte, Human Anatomy and the Frontal Lobes.  Part II: Patient 
Behavior in Complex and Social Situations:  The “Environmental Dependency Syndrome,” 19 
ANN. NEUROLOGY 335, 342 (1986). 
 131. See Francois L’Hermitte, Part I:  Imitation and Utilization Behavior:  A 
Neuropsychological Study of 75 Patients, 19 ANN. NEUROLOGY 326, 333 (1986). 
 132. Ely, supra note 95, at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
 133. Damasio, supra note 3, at 8. 
 134. Id. at 171-79. 
 135. Bitz & Bitz, supra note 44, at 257.  See generally Jonathan Haidt & Frederik 
Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Moral Psychology, in MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 2:  THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed. 
forthcoming) (stating that “[w]hen emotion is removed from decision making 
people do not become hyperlogical or hyperethical; they become unable to feel the 
rightness and wrongness of simple decisions and judgments”). 
 136. See Bitz & Bitz, supra note 44, at 257-60; see also Dolan, supra note 100, at 928. 
 137. Raine’s “prefrontal dysfunction hypothesis” provides an integrative 
explanation for the psychophysiology (EEG, skin conductance, and heart rate studies 
showing under arousal and heightened attention to stimulating events) underlying 
antisocial behavior as well as the deficits in cognitive and interpersonal functioning 
often seen in antisocial individuals.  “[P]refrontal dysfunction results in arousal, 
orienting, and anticipatory fear deficits (in addition to personality and cognitive 
deficits) that in turn predispose to antisocial behavior.”  RAINE, supra note 27, at 301; 
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unlike normal individuals, those with frontal lobe damage do not 
generate anticipatory skin conductance responses (indicating visceral 
sensory arousal) when contemplating risky choices.138 
People with FLD tend to make risky decisions in order to achieve 
short-term rewards, and are relatively insensitive to long-term 
negative consequences.139  This has been demonstrated using a 
neuropsychological assessment tool designed to simulate real-world 
decision making—the Iowa Gambling Task, which requires 
participants to develop a strategy for minimizing losses and 
maximizing gains in a card gambling game.140  People with frontal 
lobe damage continue to make disadvantageous choices despite 
being aware of the better long-term strategy because the risky choices 
produce short-term rewards.141  This “inability to reason and decide 
advantageously in risky situations is likely to contribute to the 
impulsivity, rule-breaking, and reckless, irresponsible behavior that 
make up four of the seven personality traits of antisocial personality 
disorder.”142 
Many of the symptoms of Antisocial Personality Disorder are 
consistent with the symptoms of frontal lobe dysfunction.143 Damage 
to the orbitofrontal cortex (“OFC”) region of the frontal lobes,144 the 
area (located just above the eye sockets) most susceptible to head 
trauma145 that has substantial neuronal connections to the limbic 
                                                 
Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous 
Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293 (1997). 
 138. Bechara et al., supra note 137.  But see Tiago V. Maia & James L. McClelland, 
A Reexamination of the Evidence for the Somatic Marker Hypothesis: What Participants Really 
Know in the Iowa Gambling Task, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 16,075 (2004) 
(questioning evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis). 
 139. DAMASIO, supra note 3, at 217. 
 140. See generally Eldad Yechiam, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Julie C. Stout & Antoine 
Bechara, Using Cognitive Models to Map Relations Between Neuropsychological Disorders and 
Human Decision-Making Deficits, 16 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 973 (2005) (reviewing 
research findings using the Iowa Gambling Task). 
 141. DAMASIO, supra note 3, at 214-17, 311; Antoine Bechara, Antonio R. Damasio, 
H. Damasio, & S.W. Anderson, Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to 
Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7, 11 (1994).  Pathological gamblers exhibit 
similar response patterns on the Iowa Gambling Task, suggesting that FLD may be 
implicated in gambling addiction.  P. Cavendini et al., Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in 
Pathological Gambling Patients, 51 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 334, 339 (2002). 
 142. RAINE, supra note 27, at 49; Raine, supra note 31, at 301. 
 143. PINCUS, supra note 43, at 78. 
 144. “[T]he orbitofrontal cortex is a nexus for sensory integration, the 
modulation of autonomic reactions, and participation in learning, prediction and 
decision making for emotional and reward-related behaviours.”  Morten L. 
Kringelbach, The Human Orbitofrontal Cortex:  Linking Reward to Hedonic Experience, 6 
NATURE:  NEUROSCIENCE 691, 691 (2005). 
 145. J. Duffy & J Campbell, Regional Prefrontal Syndromes:  A Theoretical and Clinical 
Overview, in THE FRONTAL LOBES AND NEUROPSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS 117 (Stephen 
Salloway, Paul F. Malloy & James D. Duffy eds., 2001). 
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system, is particularly likely to produce repetitive, impulsive criminal 
behavior.  “Whereas damage to the orbitofrontal cortex in adults 
impairs somatic markers for decision making, it spares abstract 
knowledge regarding decision making; such patients can usually 
describe what to do in an abstract choice, but become impaired when 
faced with actually having to choose themselves.”146  People with 
significant damage often exhibit “pseudopsychopathy”—showing the 
behavioral characteristics of psychopaths—but more frequently 
displaying impulsive aggression rather than instrumental aggression, 
and without the psychopaths’ charm and social skills.147  Unlike true 
psychopaths, they often feel remorse for their actions.148  Those with 
pseudopsychopathic syndrome show a diminished fear of 
punishment and have particular difficulty delaying gratification.149 
The development of psychopathy150 may in some cases be traced to 
frontal lobe damage early in life,151 which may prevent the child from 
forming “internal emotional models” that help him or her 
understand and appreciate the feelings and emotional needs of 
others.152  Professor Steven Anderson and colleagues report the cases 
of several adults who sustained OFC lesions before sixteen months of 
age.153 In addition to exhibiting the behavioral symptoms of FLD, they 
had impaired moral reasoning and even lacked an understanding of 
basic social norms.  “[D]amage to the orbitofrontal cortex incurred 
early in childhood impairs not only actual decision making, but 
abstract knowledge regarding advantageous choices and specifically 
about right and wrong—that is, moral knowledge.”154 Proper frontal 
lobe functioning may be necessary to learn from experiences of 
reward and punishment and for social perspective taking, both of 
                                                 
 146. Adolphs, supra note 112, at 173. 
 147. See Robert D. Hare, Performance of Psychopaths on Cognitive Tasks Related to 
Frontal Lobe Function, 93 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 133, 136-39 (1984); Morgan & 
Lilienfeld, supra note 35, at 122-23; R. Blair, Neurocognitive Models of Aggression, the 
Antisocial Personality Disorders, and Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY AND 
PSYCHIATRY 727, 728 (2001). 
 148. Knight & Stuss, supra note 38, at 586. 
 149. ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN:  FRONTAL LOBES AND THE 
CIVILIZED MIND 146, 146 (2001). 
 150. Psychopathy is “[a] severe form of antisocial personality disorder, 
characterized by callousness and lack of empathy.”  Moll et al., supra note 109, at 807. 
 151. See Paul J. Eslinger et al., Developmental Consequences of Childhood Frontal Lobe 
Damage, 49 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 764, 764 (1992). 
 152. Grisolia, supra note 42, at 83-85; see also Tranel, Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 
supra note 109, at 349. 
 153. Steven W. Anderson et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to 
Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE:  NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1032 (1999). 
 154. Adolphs, supra note 115, at 173. 
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which are crucial for the development of empathy and moral 
reasoning skills.155 
Finally, the frontal lobes also contain the brain’s major 
serotonergic projections, and abnormalities in serotonin metabolism 
may contribute to impulsive aggression.  Research has shown a strong 
link between aggression and low levels of the neurotransmitter 
serotonin.156  PET scans of people who exhibit impulsive aggression 
show less activity, relative to normal individuals, in the inhibitory 
regions of the prefrontal lobes in response to a serotonergic stimulus 
that activates the inhibitory regions of the brain.157 
Having discussed the neuroscience research on the link between 
FLD and criminal behavior, we turn now to an analysis of its 
implications for criminal jurisprudence.  The next Part discusses the 
admissibility of FLD evidence.  Following a brief review of this 
foundational issue, Part III presents the proposal for a return to 
control tests for insanity. 
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF FLD EVIDENCE 
Courts generally admit evidence of FLD, including neuroimaging 
and neuropsychological test results.158  Federal courts use the 
admissibility standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
                                                 
 155. Id.; Paul J. Eslinger, Neurological and Neuropsychological Bases of Empathy, 39 
EUR. NEUROLOGY 193-99 (1998); Anderson et al., supra note 153; J.L. Muller et al., 
Abnormalities in Emotion Processing with Cortical and Subcortical Regions in Criminal 
Psychopaths:  Evidence from a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study Using Pictures 
with Emotional Content, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 152, 152 (2003). 
 156. See Davidson, Putnam & Larson, supra note 121; Filley et al., supra note 30, at 
2 (concluding that abnormal serotonin metabolism is a primary neurobiological 
cause of violence). 
 157. Antonia S. New et al., Blunted Prefrontal Cortical 18Fluorodeoxyglucose Positron 
Emission Tomography Response to Metachlorophenylpiperazine in Impulsive Aggression, 59 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 621, 621 (2002). 
 158. Evidence of FLD is typically introduced through the testimony of 
psychiatrists, psychologists (often neuropsychologists), and neurologists.  Although 
courts are receptive to challenges based on a physician’s lack of psychiatric or 
neurological training, see Commissioner v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 1175-76 (Mass. 
1986), it is well established that psychologists may testify about neuropsychological 
and neuroimaging findings.  See Daniel A. Martell, Forensic Neuropsychology and the 
Criminal Law, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 327 (1992) (citing Jenkins v. United States, 
307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); Hoskins v. State, 702 So. 2d 202, 208 (Fla. 1997), 
particularly when they have training in neuropsychology or physiological psychology.  
Courts rely on the evidentiary principle that the admission of an expert is based on 
his or her specialized “knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.”  See State 
v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261, 1277 (Or. 2000) (allowing testimony of neuropsychologist on 
defendant’s FLD).  As one court explained, “[t]he critical factor is the [witness’s] 
actual experience and the probable probative value of his testimony.”  Monico, 488 
N.E.2d at 1176 (citing United States v. Green, 307 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1962) 
(noting that the psychologist expert was trained in neuropsychology)). 
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Pharmaceuticals.159  Daubert requires trial judges to act as evidentiary 
“gatekeepers,”  by considering four factors when evaluating the 
reliability of proffered scientific evidence:  (1) its falsifiability (i.e., 
whether the hypotheses can be tested empirically), (2) the error rates 
of the methods used, (3) the extent of peer review and publication of 
relevant scientific findings, and (4) its general acceptance in the 
scientific community.  Though the Daubert standard has been 
adopted in many states, the majority of states still use a variant of the 
traditional Frye standard,160 which only requires judges to determine if 
the proffered evidence has gained “general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.”161  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael162 extends the Daubert 
standard to the clinical testimony of mental health experts:  trial 
judges “must determine whether [their] testimony has ‘a reliable 
basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] 
discipline.’”163   
There are, however, no reported criminal cases involving Frye or 
Daubert hearings on proffered FLD evidence.164  Challenges to the 
admissibility of clinical or scientific evidence are uncommon in 
criminal cases due to the longstanding practice of deferring to 
forensic experts165 and the limited resources available to most 
criminal defendants.  A study of all federal criminal cases decided 
between 1993 and 2001 found only seventy-five cases involving 
Daubert challenges to the admissibility of behavioral science 
evidence.166 
Though the reality of FLD and its effect on judgment and impulse 
control is well accepted in the scientific community, the reliability of 
                                                 
 159. 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 160. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 351 
JURIMETRICS 351, 351 (2004). 
 161. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 162. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  Generally speaking, valid and reliable clinical evidence 
will be grounded in science, since diagnostic categories and techniques are derived 
from scientific research.  See Alan M. Goldstein, Marchelle R. Thomson, Richard E. 
Redding & David Osman, The Role of Research in Forensic Psychological Testimony:  Do 
Judges Listen?, 3 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 89, 97 (2003); Richard E. Redding & 
Daniel C. Murrie, Judicial Decision Making About Forensic Mental Health Evidence, in 
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING TOPICS AND EXPANDING ROLES 683, 687-90 (Alan M. 
Goldstein ed., 2006). 
 163. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).  
 164. There are only a few reported cases of litigated Frye or Daubert challenges to 
FLD evidence in civil cases.  See, e.g., Fini v. General Motors Corp., No. 227592, 2003 
WL 1861025 (Mich. App. Apr. 8, 2003). 
 165. See Redding & Murrie, supra note 162; Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, 
Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 267,  267 (2001). 
 166. Henry F. Fradella, Adam Fogarty & Linda O’Neill, The Impact of Daubert on 
the Admissibility of Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 403 (2003). 
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a diagnosis of frontal lobe dysfunction and evidence about how it may 
have contributed to the instant offense would be open to Daubert or 
Frye challenges, particularly with respect to neuroimaging results.  
Neuroimages are not direct visualizations of the brain.  Rather, they 
“simplify complicated data about the brain, but . . . are mutable, 
constructed representations, far more similar to charts and line 
graphs than to photographs.”167  There are no precise criteria for 
differentiating normal from abnormal imaging results, nor for 
quantifying the extent of FLD.  Thus, “[i]t would be a step in the 
right direction if the imaging expert in the courtroom were held 
accountable for his or her expert testimony by the same standards of 
peer review”168 that are applied when evaluating scientific research 
findings under Daubert.169 
But because judges virtually never conduct, sua sponte, Daubert or 
Frye reviews in criminal cases, litigants must raise evidentiary 
challenges.170  Prosecutors may be well-advised to do so.  As one 
defense attorney explained: 
It is one thing for a psychiatrist to get on a witness stand and give 
his opinion, but to be able to show a jury a PET scan, with these big 
dark areas in the frontal lobes, which someone has called a “rat 
bite,” is a very effective form of evidence.171 
According to a recent study, mock jurors were more likely to find a 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity when provided with 
neuroimaging showing brain damage in the defendant’s frontal lobes 
than when presented with clinical testimony alone.172  “Most juries 
                                                 
 167. Kulynych, Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, supra note 72, at 244. 
 168. Donald Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry, 31 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 96 (2003); see also Kulynych, Neuroimages as Scientific 
Evidence, supra note 72, at 241-42 (arguing that because the production of a 
neuroimage involves the manipulation and analysis of technical parameters of the 
imaging process, about which mental health professionals have little expertise, “the 
presentation of neuroimaging evidence ought to encompass witnesses involved in the 
production and data analysis phases of the neuroimaging study as well as the 
psychiatrist or neurologist who uses the image”). 
 169. In one case the trial court refused to admit the defendant’s proffered PET 
scan evidence suggesting that he had FLD, finding it to be too uncertain.  People v. 
Protsman, 88 Cal. App. 4th 509,  509 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 170. See Goldstein et al., supra note 162, at 98. 
 171. Lori D’Agincourt, PET Findings Support Insanity Defense Case, DIAGNOSTIC 
IMAGING, Jan. 1993, at 45. 
 172. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcus, Phineas Gage on Trial:  The Effects of 
Neuroimaging & Brain Injury on Decisions of Insanity, Paper presented at the American 
Psychology-Law Society Conference (Mar. 8, 2005). 
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feel that most mental patients are really faking . . . [i]f you show them 
the [brain scan], they’re convinced.”173 
In capital cases, jurors have reported giving considerable weight to 
neuroimaging evidence in deciding not to impose the death 
penalty.174  Neuroimaging evidence can also be sufficiently 
compelling to convince prosecutors to reduce the charges or offer a 
plea bargain.175  The singular persuasiveness of neuroimaging is 
illustrated in the dissenting opinion of a Florida Supreme Court 
Justice, who complained that the experts’ conclusions, based largely 
on the defendant’s history and neurological examinations, were not 
based on “objective” testing “such as brain scans . . . as differentiated 
from the experts’ subjective conclusions.”176 
III.  MODERN NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL INSANITY 
We turn now to the proposal to revive control tests for insanity.  
First, however, it is helpful to briefly review the history of insanity 
standards in American jurisprudence. 
A.  The History of Insanity Standards in American Jurisprudence 
[As science and the knowledge of the disease [of insanity] 
progressed . . . the rule has been extended in modern times until it 
begins to comprehend within its saving influences most of those 
who by the visitation of disease are deprived of the power of self-
government.  Yet the law, in its slow and cautious progress, still lags 
far behind the advance of true knowledge.177  
Insanity defenses,178 when successful, are completely exculpatory, 
relieving the defendant of criminal liability with a verdict of “Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity” (“NGRI”).179 
                                                 
 173. Don J. DeBenedictis, Criminal Minds:  PET Scans Used to Prove Accused Killers’ 
Brain Abnormalities, 76 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (1990) (quoting Dr. Bernard Diamond, 
Professor Emeritus of Law and Medicine, University of California at Berkeley). 
 174. See Kulynych, High-Tech Crystal Ball, supra note 72, at 252-53. 
 175. See D’Agincourt, supra note 171, at 45 (reporting case of sixty-four-year-old 
Herbert Weinstein, who had no history of violent behavior but strangled his wife 
after a minor provocation).  After a PET scan revealed a large arachnoid cyst in the 
defendant’s frontal lobe, the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain for manslaughter.  
Id. 
 176. Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 80 (Fla. 2002) (Wells, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
   177. People v. Klien, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (quoted in 
Robert E. Mensel, Right Feeling and Knowing Right:  Insanity in Testators & Criminals in 
Nineteenth Century America, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 397, 417 (2005). 
 178. The insanity defense is to be distinguished from the issue of adjudicative 
competence (or “competence to stand trial”).  Competence to stand trial is not a 
defense, but rather, an inquiry into the defendant’s capacity to understand and 
participate in adjudicatory proceedings.  See generally Richard E. Redding, supra note 
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33, at 416 (providing chart contrasting competence to stand trial the insanity defense 
doctrines).  The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution bars the adjudication of incompetent defendants.  A defendant must 
have the “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding[;]” a “rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him,” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), and the 
capacity “to assist in preparing his defense.”  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 
(1975).  But the bar for competence is set rather low, requiring only a minimal level 
of rational understanding and ability to work with the attorney.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hampton, 959 S.W. 2d 444, 449-50 (Mo. 1997) (upholding trial court’s finding that 
defendant was competent to stand trial, despite neurologist’s testimony that 
defendant’s frontal lobe injury impaired his ability to assist in his defense); United 
States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996) (accord); State v. VanNatta, 506 
N.W.2d 63, 66-68 (N.D. 1993). 
When a defendant’s FLD is severe or present alongside other mental impairments, 
it may form the basis for a finding of adjudicative incompetence.  See State v. Hall, 
752 N.E.2d 318, 320-26 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).  Such individuals may not, for 
example, fully appreciate their legal situation, maintain motivation and attention 
when interacting with counsel, or be able to testify effectively or make sound 
judgments about their defense options.  See Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, 
Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 353, 358 
(2001) (discussing adult legal and clinical standards for competency).  Even when 
not leading to a finding of incompetence, accommodations may be made when a 
defendant’s impaired ability to participate effectively is brought to the court’s 
attention.  In United States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2000), the examining 
psychologist testified that although the defendant was competent to stand trial, his 
frontal lobe deficits would “clearly interfere with the quality of his ability to 
participate in his defense.”  Id. at 691.  The court asked the psychologist for 
recommendations on how best to structure the proceedings to facilitate the 
defendant’s participation.  (The development of neuropsychological tools and 
standards to assess defendants for FLD and its impact on their adjudicative 
competence is an important area for future research.  Neuropsychological testing 
would also be valuable for assessing defendants’ potential for competency 
restoration.  Martell, supra note 158, at 323-24). 
In addition, evidence of FLD has been used to challenge a defendant’s 
competence to plead guilty or waive constitutional rights.  In State v. Marshall, 27 
P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001), the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing 
that he was incompetent to enter the plea due to FLD and other serious mental 
disorders.  The Supreme Court of Washington remanded the case for a competency 
hearing to determine whether the plea was entered voluntarily, given evidence of the 
defendant’s significant mental impairment, including the “MRI [which] revealed 
[that] the decision-making area of his brain had shrunk significantly . . . . and frontal 
lobe damage that affects his ability to plan ahead, conceptualize the future and make 
reasoned decisions.”  Id. at 196-97.  In Ward v. Sternes, 209 F. Supp. 2d 950 (C.D. Ill. 
2002), the U.S. District Court granted the defendant’s habeas corpus petition, 
finding that the defendant’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to testify was not a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver since FLD impaired the defendant’s 
understanding of the important right he was waiving.  Id. at 959-60. 
FLD evidence has also been used to argue that a defendant’s confession should be 
suppressed because the Miranda rights waiver was not given knowingly, voluntarily, or 
intelligently.  See People v. Wilson, 732 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ill. 2000).  These claims are 
seldom successful, however.  In Roberts v. State, a neurologist testified that “if it were 
not for the injury [the defendant] sustained in 1980 he would not have committed 
this crime.  Prior to [his] accident in 1980 he had no behavioral problems.”  102 
S.W.3d 482, 499 (Ark. 2003).  MRI scans showed that portions of his right and left 
frontal lobes were missing due to a traumatic brain injury sustained when he was 
twelve-years-old.  Id.  He also had an IQ of seventy-six, placing him in the borderline 
mentally-retarded range of intellectual functioning.  Id.  But the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas refused to conclude that FLD made him especially vulnerable to the police 
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The first formal test for insanity in English jurisprudence arose 
from the celebrated 1843 trial of Daniel McNaghten,180 who shot and 
killed British Prime Minister Peel’s personal secretary.  The shot was 
intended for the Prime Minister.  McNaghten pleaded insanity, based 
on a theory of impaired control,181 with nine medical experts 
describing him as suffering from extreme paranoia “entangled in an 
elaborate system of delusions.”182  Among these was the belief that 
Prime Minister Peel was the devil in human form who was conspiring 
to kill him.183  McNaghten was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity,184 and he was committed to an insane asylum where he 
remained until his death.  Public indignation, fueled by Queen 
Victoria’s dissatisfaction with the verdict, prompted the House of 
Lords to request the Queen’s Bench to develop an insanity 
standard.185  The result came to be known as the McNaghten test, 
which provided that a defendant is presumed sane unless it can be 
shown that he was “labouring under such a defect of reason, from 
                                                 
officer’s inducements to confess.  Id.; see also State v. Mears, 749 A.2d 600, 605-06 (Vt. 
2000) (holding that despite FLD and other mental impairments, defendant’s 
understanding was sufficient to establish a knowing voluntary, and intelligent waiver 
of his waiver Miranda rights). 
 179. Some states also provide juries with the option of returning a verdict of Guilty 
But Mentally Ill (“GBMI”) when the jury finds that the defendant suffers from a 
mental illness but does not find that he or she was insane.  Typically, the defendant 
receives a sentence similar or identical to the one he or she would have received if 
found guilty, but is evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric treatment.  See 
generally REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 15, at 604-13.  There are several 
reported cases in which it appears that the jury’s GBMI verdict was based, in 
substantial part, on evidence of the defendant’s FLD.  See Adams v. State, 330 S.E.2d 
869, 871 (Ga. 1985); Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 699-701 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 180. McNaghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
   181. See Mensel, supra note 177, at 412. 
 182. RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY & THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 20 (1967) (quoting Dr. 
Isaac Ray, the father of forensic psychiatry, who participated indirectly in the 
McNaghten proceedings). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Lord Chief Justice Tindal submitted the case to the jury with the following 
instruction: 
The point I shall have to submit to you is, whether on the whole of the 
evidence you have heard, you are satisfied that at the time the act was 
committed . . . the prisoner had that competent use of his understanding as 
that he knew that what he was doing, by the very act itself, a wicked and 
wrong thing?  If the prisoner was not sensible at the time . . . that it was a 
violation of the law of God or of man, undoubtedly he was not responsible 
for that act . . . If on balancing the evidence in your minds, you think the 
prisoner capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, then he was a 
responsible agent and liable to all the penalties the law imposes.  If not . . . 
then you will probably not take upon yourselves to find the prisoner guilty.  
If this is your opinion, then you will acquit the prisoner. 
McNaghten’s Case, at 719. 
 185. See Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” 
Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States:  An 
Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1236-37 (1966). 
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disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act 
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know that what he 
was doing was wrong.”186  The justices implicitly rejected a volitional 
standard.187 
English and American courts were using a crude “right and wrong” 
test for insanity before McNaghten and readily adopted McNaghten as a 
formalization of that standard.188  Today it remains the most widely 
accepted test for insanity.  By the 1950s, most American jurisdictions 
had adopted the McNaghten rule.189  McNaghten is known as a 
“cognitive test,” because it requires the defendant to show that he or 
she did not understand the nature190 and consequences of the criminal 
act or did not understand that the act was (legally or morally) wrong.191  
Such a lack of understanding is usually due to serious mental illness, 
typically a psychotic disorder or other mental disorder having 
psychotic features (e.g., delusions or hallucinations).192 
In contrast, “irresistible impulse” (also called “volitional” or 
“control”)193 standards (or “tests”) for insanity provide an insanity 
defense to defendants who are unable, due to mental disorder, to 
exercise behavioral control.  Control tests come in many variations,194 
                                                 
 186. 67 HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 722 (1843). 
   187.  Mensel, supra note 177, at 413-14. 
 188. See Platt & Diamond, supra note 185, at 1250-57 (summarizing twelve 
American cases between 1816 and 1841 that used a “right and wrong” test for 
insanity); see also JOHN BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF 
HOMICIDE 116 (1967) (describing adoption of the McNaghten rule across U.S. 
jurisdictions). 
 189. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PEN. CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01, at 165 
(1985). 
 190. The classic example of a lack of awareness of the nature of one’s act is 
provided in the MODEL PEN. CODE (§ 4.01, cmt., at 166)—a man strangles his wife, 
thinking that he is squeezing lemons. 
 191. See United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 232-33 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing 
the debate in the criminal law on whether the standard should be the defendant’s 
understanding of legal versus moral wrongfulness); SAMUEL J. BRAKEL & ALEXANDER 
D. BROOKS, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 34-35 (2001). 
 192. Psychosis entails a break with reality, usually involving delusions, 
hallucinations, or confused and irrational thinking.  DSM-IV, supra note 5, at 827.  A 
delusion is “[a] false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is 
firmly sustained despite what almost everybody else believes and despite what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary.”  Id. at 
821.  Hallucinations are false or distorted sensory experiences, which may be in the 
form of visions, sounds or voices, tactile feelings, smells, or taste.  Id. at 823.  Most 
defendants acquitted under cognitive tests for insanity suffer from schizophrenia or 
other psychotic condition, or bipolar disorder or major depression (with psychotic 
features).  See BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 191, at 83-91. 
 193. “Control” is the more legally accurate term because the insanity defense does 
not entail a claim of involuntary action or lack of volition.  See infra note 254. 
 194. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 14-51-01 (West 2005) (“The defendant was insane at the 
time of the commission of the crime if . . .  [he or she] could not prevent himself [or] 
herself from committing the act.”) (emphasis added); State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 
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but rarely do they use the term “irresistible impulse,”195 instead 
framing the test in terms of the defendant’s inability to control his or 
her conduct.196  Thus, juries are not usually required to find that the 
defendant’s acts were, in fact, completely irresistible.197  Instead, the 
jury is asked to consider the defendant’s capacity for self-control.198  
According to the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
formulation, the control test most commonly found in state statutes 
(see Appendix B):  “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if 
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.”199 
The “irresistible impulse” concept predates the McNaghten case in 
both English and American jurisprudence.200  “[W]ritings in the field 
of medical jurisprudence emphasized that a criminal defendant 
might have known what he was doing and that it was wrong, but 
nonetheless have been unable to control his conduct.”201  After 
                                                 
(R.I. 1979) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if . . . [his capacity] to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly 
be held responsible.”) (emphasis added); Godley v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 368, 370 
(Va. Ct. App. 1986) (“The [irresistible impulse] defense is applicable only where the 
accused’s mind has become ‘so impaired by disease that [the accused] is totally 
deprived of the mental power to control or restrain his [or her] act.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1954))). 
   195.   See Appendix B. 
 196. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Criminal Law § 7.3a, 390 (4th ed. 2003) (citing Isaac 
Ray, THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 263 (1838)). 
 197. See id. (“[F]or the jury is not ordinarily told that the defendant must have 
acted upon a sudden impulse or that his acts must have been totally irresistible.”).  
The classic example, taught in criminal law, of a truly irresistible impulse is one that 
satisfies the “policeman at the elbow test,” which asks whether the defendant would 
have committed the offense had a policeman been present.  See United States v. 
Kunak, 17 C.M.R. 346, 357-58 (C.M.A. 1954) (describing the “policeman at the elbow 
test”). 
 198. See LAFAVE, supra note 196, at 390. 
 199. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) (emphasis added).  Although the Model 
Penal Code (“MPC”) test contains the cognitive and control prongs of earlier tests, 
they are modified by the term “substantial.”  Thus, complete cognitive incapacity or 
lack of control is not required under the MPC.  “The adoption of the standard of 
substantial capacity may well be the Code’s most significant alteration of the 
prevailing tests.  It was recognized, of course, that ‘substantial’ is an open-ended 
concept, but its quantitative connotation was believed to be sufficiently precise for 
purposes of practical administration.”  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE 
COMMENTARIES § 4.01, at 172 (1985). 
   200.   See generally Mensel, supra note 177, at 414. 
 201. See See LAFAVE, supra note 196, at 389 (stating that some individuals are 
“irresistibly impelled to the commission of criminal acts while fully conscious of their 
nature and consequences”); FORBES WINSLOW, THE PLEA OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 92 (1843) (stating that some individuals “may be perfectly competent to draw a 
correct distinction between right and wrong . . . [yet are] driven by an irresistible 
impulse”). 
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McNaghten, however, English courts typically refused to allow lack of 
control claims, but medical and legal commentators of the time 
argued that the defense should be available, and many courts began 
to allow it by the early 1900s.202 
But a crude form of the control test appeared in American 
jurisprudence much earlier—in 1834,203 the term “irresistible 
impulse” was first used in American caselaw in 1844,204 and a few 
jurisdictions apparently adopted control tests during the 1860s and 
1870s.205  In the 1887 Alabama case of Parsons v. State,206 the court 
formulated the following jury instructions for use in cases where the 
defense of insanity is raised: 
First.  Was the defendant at the time of the commission of the 
alleged crime, as a matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the mind, 
so as to be either idiotic, or otherwise insane?  Second.  If such be 
the case, did he know right from wrong as applied to the particular 
act in question?  If he did not have such knowledge, he is not 
legally responsible.  Third.  If he did have such knowledge, he may 
nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following 
conditions concur:  (1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental 
disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and 
the wrong, and to avoid the act in question, as that his free agency 
was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the same time, the alleged 
crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of 
cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.207 
                                                 
 202. See Edwin R. Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. 
PA. L. REV. 956, 961-65 (1952) (discussing cases and commentaries); see also id. at 969-
76 (reviewing the criminal codes of European, Asian and South American countries 
providing a control defense). 
 203. State v. Thompson, Wright 617, 622 (Ohio 1834) (instructing the jury that “if 
his mind was such that he retained the power of discriminating, or to leave him 
conscious he was doing wrong, a state of mind in which at the time of the deed he was free to 
forbear, or to do the act, he is responsible as a sane man”) (emphasis added). 
 204. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 502 (Mass. 1844) (instructing the jury 
to consider whether the defendant “acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable 
impulse”); see also Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 267 (Pa. 1846) (instructing 
the jury to consider whether defendant had “an irresistible inclination to kill”). 
 205. See Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 863-64 (Ala. 1887) (discussing earlier cases). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 866-67.  In discussing the need for an insanity test to supplement  
McNaghten, the court stated: 
The following practicable suggestion is made in the able treatise of Baifour 
Browne above alluded to: ‘In a case of alleged insanity, then,’ he says, ‘if the 
individual suffering from enfeeblement of intellect, delusion, or any other 
form of mental aberration, was looked upon as, to the extent of this 
delusion, under the influence of duress, (the dire duress of disease,) and in 
so far incapacitated to choose the good and eschew the evil, in so far, it seems to 
us,’ he continues, ‘would the requirements of the law be fulfilled; and in that 
way it would afford an opening, by the evidence of experts, for the proof of 
the amount of self-duress in each individual case, and thus alone can the 
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In 1962, the American Law Institute drafted a Model Penal Code 
insanity standard that addressed the objections of psychiatrists and 
jurists who believed that McNaghten was too restrictive because it did 
not apply to defendants who lacked the capacity to control their 
conduct.208  By 1980, the Model Penal Code standard had been 
adopted by most of the federal circuits and more than half the 
states.209  (In addition, several jurisdictions adopted the expansive 
Durham test, which provided an insanity defense for criminal offenses 
that were “the product of mental disease or defect.”)210 But a number 
of jurisdictions still refused to adopt a control test, viewing it as an 
unnecessary broadening of the insanity standard, a longstanding 
concern of courts.211  In 1924, for example, the British House of 
Lords refused to adopt a control test despite the recommendation of 
the British Medical Association and a government commission.212  
                                                 
criterion of law and the criterion of the inductive science of medical psychology be made 
to coincide.’  This, in our judgment, is the practical solution of the difficulty 
before us, as it preserves to the courts and the juries, respectively, a 
harmonious field for the full assertion of their time-honored functions.  So 
great, it may be added, are the embarrassments growing out of the old rule, 
as expounded by the judges in the house of English lords, that in March, 
1874, a bill was brought before the house of commons, supposed to have 
been draughted by the learned counsel for the queen, Mr. Fitzjames 
Stephen, which introduced into the old rule the new element of an absence 
of the power of self-control, produced by diseases affecting the mind; and 
this proposed alteration of the law was cordially recommended by the late 
Chief Justice Cockburn, his only objection being that the principle was 
proposed to be limited to the case of homicide. 
Id. at 862. 
 208. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 18, at 395-96; Bernard L. Diamond, From 
M’Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CAL. L. REV. 189, 189 (1962) (arguing that 
“M’Naghten is dead”); KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 114-15 (1968) 
(criticizing M’Naghten as an “absurdity”); see also ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 68 (1967) (stating that “[t]he ‘irresistible impulse’ rule was widely heralded 
by many lawyers and psychiatrists as the way to remedy all that was wrong with 
NcNaghten”); Keedy, supra note 202, at 989 (citing numerous medical authorities).  A 
survey conducted in the early 1950s found that ninety-one percent of forensic 
psychiatrists agreed that there are “cases where a person, suffering from mental 
derangement knows that it is wrong to inflict bodily harm (killing, maiming, 
ravishing) upon another person, but owing to the mental derangement is incapable 
of controlling (resisting) the impulse to commit such bodily harm.”  Id. at 989 
(reporting survey conducted by Dr. Philip Roche, Chairman of the Committee on 
Forensic Psychiatry, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry). 
 209. 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 9A-3.5, at 
162 (2d ed. 2001). 
 210. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 211. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 208, at 77 (stating that numerous jurisdictions were 
concerned that the irresistible impulse test “broaden[ed] the [insanity] defense far 
too much, making it available to psychopaths, to neurotics, perhaps to all who 
commit crime.  This is said to follow from the impossibility of determining which acts 
were uncontrollable, rather than merely uncontrolled, and the attendant suspicion 
that the former category does not really exist.”). 
 212. Keedy, supra note 202, at 963-64. 
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Lord Hewart expressed the concern that “it would be impossible to 
distinguish  between the impulse of the person said to be suffering 
from mental disease, and the impulse of the ordinary offender who is 
moved to commit a crime by the desire for gain or revenge.”213  
Indeed, as far back as 1897, the Supreme Court of California opined: 
We do not know that the impulse was irresistible, but only that it 
was not resisted.  Whether irresistible or not must depend upon the 
relative force of the impulse and the restraining force, and it has 
been well said that to grant immunity from punishment to one who 
retains sufficient intelligence to understand the consequences to 
him of a violation of the law, may be to make a resistible impulse 
irresistible, which before was not.214 
The popularity of control tests began to wane by the 1970s, and 
grew even more unpopular in the wake of John Hinckley’s acquittal, 
under the Model Penal Code standard, for the shooting of President 
Reagan in 1981.215  In any event, the ground already was fertile for the 
abandonment of control tests.  The heyday of optimism about our 
ability to treat and rehabilitate criminal offenders had passed,216 and 
mental health professionals and jurists alike had grown increasingly 
skeptical about the validity of the irresistible impulse concept.217  
Currently, only eighteen states and the District of Columbia 
incorporate a control test in their insanity standards (see Appendix B), 
and five states (Idaho, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, and Utah) 
have abolished the insanity defense altogether.  Most states, as well as 
the federal courts, use only a cognitive test for insanity.218 
B.  A Proposal to Revive Control Tests for Insanity 
McNaghten, which gained prominence during a “rationalist era” 
when personality functioning was viewed primarily from a cognitive 
                                                 
 213. Id. at 964. 
 214. People v. Hubert, 51 P. 329, 331 (Cal. 1897). 
 215. See Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Desk Chairs on the Titanic:  Why the 
Incarceration of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and 
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the 
Insanity Defense, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH.  L. & POL’Y 1, 35-36 (2005) (summarizing insanity 
defense reforms after Hinckley). 
 216. The disease theory of crime had gained popularity during the 1950s and 
1960s, and there was great optimism about the ability of mental health professionals 
to treat and rehabilitate offenders.  One of the best known proponents of this view 
was the psychiatrist Karl Menninger, whose book The Crime of Punishment represented 
the leading treatise on the subject.  See MENNINGER, supra note 208, at 116-18. 
 217. See infra notes 283-296 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Kimberly Collins et al., The John Hinckley Trial & Its Effects on the Insanity 
Defense, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hinckley/hinckleyinsanity 
.htm (discussing the response of various states and the federal government post-
Hinckley). 
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perspective,219 is a narrow test that excludes from exculpation the 
defendant who knew right from wrong yet could not control his or 
her behavior.  But frontally-damaged individuals, particularly those 
having the form of FLD that produces primarily impulsivity and 
behavioral disinhibition, do not lack understanding, they lack 
behavioral control.  Thus, insanity defenses based on FLD are few in 
number and apparently have not fared well.220  In the thirty-two states 
lacking a control test for insanity, defendants with FLD cannot plead 
insanity due to impaired impulse control, leaving most without a 
viable insanity plea under prevailing cognitive tests for insanity.221  As 
                                                 
 219. See Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense:  
Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 289, 303-06 (1998) (citing RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 30 
(1984)). 
 220. See, e.g., State v. Sopczak, 823 So. 978, 986 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that 
defendant’s evidence of FLD failed to satisfy the McNaghten test for insanity since 
experts testified that he could distinguish right from wrong, though perhaps he 
could not have restrained his impulses); Ward v. Sternes, 209 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954 
(C.D. Ill. 2002) (discussing jury’s rejection of defendant’s insanity defense); State v. 
Thompson, No. E202-02631-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22018899, at *14-15 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Feb. 2, 2004) (reversing trial court’s decision to set aside jury verdict of guilty 
and enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity); Commonwealth v. Monico, 
488 N.E.2d 1168, 1173-76 (Mass. 1986) (noting trial court’s failure to give insanity 
defense instructions to the jury and reversing conviction on this failure). 
In lieu of the insanity defense, some defendants with FLD may rely on the doctrine 
of diminished capacity.  Available in only a few states, “diminished capacity” is a par-
tial defense claiming that the defendant did not have the capacity to form the mental 
state (usually the specific intent of acting “intentionally,” “purposely,” or “know-
ingly”) for the crime charged.  See State v. Atsbeha, 981 P.2d 883, 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999) (asserting that diminished capacity exists when “a mental disorder . . . im-
paired the defendant’s ability to form the specific intent to commit the crime 
charged”) (quoting State v. Ellis, 963 P.2d 843, 843 (Wash. 1998)).  Similarly, some 
states allow the defendant to argue that he did not form the specific intent at the 
time the offense was committed. See, e.g., State v. Balderama, 88 P.3d 845, 851-53 
(N.M. 2004) (noting the defendant’s lack of “willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing” intent necessary for a first degree murder conviction); State v. Joseph, 590 
S.E.2d 718, 722-23 (W. Va. 2003) (discussing rationale behind “diminished capacity” 
defense).  Evidence that the defendant acted impulsively, due to FLD, may refute the 
prosecution’s case that the defendant formed the specific intent to commit the crime 
or acted with premeditation (e.g., as may be required to obtain a conviction for first-
degree murder).  Therefore, the defendant could only be convicted of a lesser of-
fense (e.g., a crime defined as acting with a mental state of “recklessness” or “negli-
gence”).    Thus far, however, it appears that diminished capacity claims have seldom 
been successful.  See, e.g., State v. Coulter, 67 S.W.3d 3, 72-73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2001) (rejecting diminished capacity defense despite significant evidence of mental 
impairment).  In State v. Papasavvas, 751 A.2d 40 (N.J. 2000), for instance, the de-
fendant argued that FLD rendered him incapable of forming the specific intent or 
purpose to kill.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that trial 
judge’s failure to admit evidence of the defendant’s FLD did not warrant a reversal of 
his conviction or death sentence.  Id. at 90-91. 
 221. Some defendants may fare better in jurisdictions with a cognitive test for 
insanity that allows defendants to claim that they did not appreciate the moral 
wrongfulness of their actions, since FLD can impair moral reasoning.  As Professor 
Price puts it, “bifrontal dysfunction acquired early in life may lead to a specific 
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we have seen, many defendants222 suffering from substantial FLD are 
cognitively intact yet have substantial impairments in impulse control.  
They understand the difference between right and wrong, but are 
unable to apply this knowledge to control their behavior.  They 
“know the rules of civilized behavior but [are] unable to follow them.”223  
Control tests are needed to ensure that defendants with FLD have 
the opportunity to prove that they lacked criminal responsibility for 
the charged offense, a right that is essential in our system of 
retributive justice.  Defendants who have a limited physiological 
ability to control their criminal behavior should be allowed to present 
evidence of a lack of culpability based on impaired impulse control.  
“[T]o exclude volitional impairments violates contemporary 
conceptualizations about brain-behavior relationships.  From a 
neuropsychological perspective, this is tantamount to saying that some 
brain lesions are morally superior to others.”224 
Revival of control tests for insanity, however, should be 
accompanied by three doctrinal modifications.  First, the qualifying 
mental disease or defect for an insanity defense225 under a control test 
                                                 
subtype of learning disability by selectively interfering with the acquisition (or 
development) of many complex faculties such as insight, foresight, social judgement, 
empathy and abstract reasoning.”  Price et al., supra note 125, at 1391.  In most cases, 
however, it would be difficult to show that a defendant’s FLD impaired his moral 
reasoning to the point that he could not differentiate right from wrong, particularly 
in jurisdictions that construe the moral wrongfulness test as requiring the defendant 
to have perceived that society generally would have condoned, on moral grounds, 
the criminal act.  See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 640 (Conn. 1997) (holding 
that defendant must prove that he or she “substantially misperceived reality and 
harbored a delusional belief that society, under the circumstances as the defendant 
honestly but mistakenly understood them, would not have morally condemned his 
actions”); State v. Cole, 755 A.2d 202 (Conn. 2000) (accord); State v. Uyesugi, 60 
P.3d 843 (Haw. 2002) (accord). 
 222. GOLDBERG, supra note 149, at 149; see also id. at 150 (suggesting the need for 
“[a] new legal construct of ‘inability to guide one’s behavior despite the availability 
of requisite knowledge’”). 
   223.   Ely, supra note 95, at 9. 
 224. Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology, supra note 41, at 72 (emphasis added). 
 225. All legal tests for insanity require, as a predicate to proving insanity, that the 
defendant prove that he or she suffers from a “mental disease or defect.”  Thus, a 
formal diagnosis improves the chances of satisfying this predicate requirement.  
SEYMOUR L. HALLECK ET AL., THE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES IN THE LEGAL PROCESS:  
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON USE AND MISUSE OF 
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES IN THE COURTS 9 (Rev. ed. 1992).  In a 1991 case, the defense 
requested that the jury instructions on insanity be changed to read “mental 
condition” rather than “mental disease,” since the experts could not opine that the 
defendant’s organic personality syndrome was a defined mental disease or illness.  
State v. Plante, 594 A.2d 1279, 1281-82 (N.H. 1991). 
Frontal lobe dysfunction is a recognized syndrome in the World Health 
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases.  INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
OF DISEASES, F07.0 (10th ed. 2003) (“frontal lobe syndrome”).  But frontal lobe 
syndrome is not yet included in the primary diagnostic guide used by American 
mental health professionals, the DSM-IV, see supra note 5.  However, depending on 
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should be defined as a “substantial dysfunction of the frontal lobes and/or 
limbic system due to brain damage or illness.”  The requirement that there 
be a substantial dysfunction due to brain injury or illness prevents 
insanity claims based only on “soft” neurological signs of frontal lobe 
impairment without any evidence of brain damage.226 (It also prevents 
claims based on a diagnosis of ADHD, for example, which produces 
impulsive behavior and may be due to low-grade, diffuse frontal lobe 
dysfunction.)227  Sub-clinical FLD absent brain damage or illness 
should not be exculpatory, and probably could not be so without 
exculpating a large minority of criminal defendants, given the high 
prevalence rate of neuropsychological dysfunction in the criminal 
defendant population.228  (Frontal lobe functioning, like other aspects 
of brain functioning, exists along a continuum.  Many people may 
have frontal lobe dysfunction to some degree, and there is room for 
criminogenic situations to produce criminal behavior in any one of 
us.)  At the same time, an overly narrow description of the qualifying 
brain disorder should also be avoided,229 as we must be wary of over-
localizing psychological processes to particular brain regions.230  The 
brain’s emotional circuitry includes a complex interrelationship 
between the frontal lobes and neuronal projections running to other 
parts of the brain, particularly the limbic system.231  Second, to guard 
against fraudulent insanity claims, states should follow the precedent 
                                                 
the behavioral manifestation of a defendant’s dysfunction, FLD may fit within several 
DSM diagnoses, including Intermittent Explosive Disorder (§ 312.34, at 663-66) or 
Dementia Due to Head Trauma (§294.1x, at 164).  Or, if due to a brain tumor, FLD 
may be diagnosed under Axes III (General Medical Conditions Related to Mental 
Disorders) of the DSM (pp. 29-30), which refers to the diagnostic medical codes 
under the INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES. 
 226. Similarly, to prevent insanity claims based on less serious mental disorders, 
the revised Federal Test requires that the mental disease or defect be “severe.”  See 
infra note 285. 
 227. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
 229. For example, mania due to bipolar disorder would also qualify as the 
predicate mental disease or defect for an insanity defense based on impaired impulse 
control.  See Michael J. Vitacco & Ira K. Packer, Mania and Insanity:  An Analysis of 
Legal Standards and Recommendations for Clinical Practice, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 
83, 88-91 (2004) (discussing how some manic episodes of bipolar disorder could 
excuse criminal responsibility). 
 230. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY:  THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 14-15 (2001) (arguing that it is difficult to link a 
specific brain area to one specific human action); see also Elizabeth A. Phelps, Brain 
Versus Behavioral Studies of Cognition, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION 295, 316-19 
(Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999) (discussing limitations of brain localization 
techniques using neuroimaging). 
 231. Morgan & Lilienfeld, supra note 35, at 130-31.  An upper-brain stem injury, 
for instance, may produce symptoms of FLD when the neuronal projections from the 
brain stem to the frontal lobes are disrupted.  Elkhonon Goldberg et al., A Reticulo-
Frontal Disconnection Syndrome, 25 CORTEX 687, 690 (1989). 
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of Bennett v. Commonwealth,232 in which the Virginia Court of Appeals 
held that “[e]vidence that an accused planned his or her criminal acts 
precludes, as a matter of law, any finding that the accused acted under an 
irresistible impulse.”233  Virginia is the only state with such a doctrine, 
and most states have long allowed insanity defenses under a control 
test even when there is clear evidence of substantial advanced 
planning before the offense.234  Third, because FLD can only be 
diagnosed through medical and psychological testing, defendants 
should be required to introduce expert testimony on the presence of 
brain dysfunction.  Currently, not all states with a control test for 
insanity require expert testimony.235 
C.  Why Control Tests for Insanity are Needed 
Writing in 1952, Professor Edwin Keedy observed that “[o]ne of 
the most controversial questions in the field of Criminal Law is 
whether an irresistible impulse, produced by mental disease, should 
be a defense.”236  The controversy continues to this day.  Opponents 
of control tests have offered, and continue to offer, three rationales 
for their abandonment:  (1) that cognitive tests for insanity are 
sufficient, since those with impaired impulse control will also be 
cognitively impaired;237 (2) that mental health professionals are 
incapable of reliably assessing the capacity for impulse control, 
particularly in relation to criminal behavior, or of differentiating 
between a truly irresistible impulse and an impulse that is merely 
difficult to resist;238 and, therefore, that control tests lead to 
erroneous insanity acquittals;239 and (3) that because “they directly 
                                                 
 232. 511 S.E.2d 439 (Va. Ct. App. 1999). 
 233. Id. at 447 (citing Rollins v. Commonwealth, 151 S.E.2d 622, 625 (Va. 1966)) 
(emphasis added).  Planning in this context should mean evidence of “deliberation,” 
and not simply premeditation—i.e., pre-existing intent. 
 234. Although poor judgment in executing a criminal plan may also reflect FLD, 
see PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS, supra note 43, at 221, prior planning with respect to the 
charged offense(s) runs counter to an excuse predicted on impaired impulse 
control.  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 70-75. 
 235. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Cook, 784 N.E.2d 608, 617 (Mass. 2003) (stating 
that insanity is a jury question that can be proven through the facts of the case, lay 
witnesses, or expert witnesses). 
 236. Keedy, supra note 202, at 956. 
 237. See infra notes 248-256 and accompanying text. 
 238. See infra notes 283-298 and accompanying text. 
 239. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 8-1.2.4 (2d ed. 2003) (“Many in the legal 
community believed that impulsivity could easily be feigned, and feared that the test 
would lead to numerous invalid insanity acquittals.”); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 208, at 
77 (citing cases and authorities); REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 15, at 558-60 
(discussing various concerns with irresistible impulse test); see also United States v. 
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pose the question of whether a person could control his or her 
behavior,”240 control tests run counter to the law’s assumption of free 
will and notion that criminals should be held accountable for their 
crimes.241  As I demonstrate below, current neuroscience and clinical 
research challenges each of these claims. 
1.  Existing cognitive tests are insufficient 
The principle behind McNaghten, namely, that defect of cognition 
as a consequence of mental disease is the primary exculpating 
factor in the determination of legal sanity, has probably never been 
other than a legal fiction.242 
There is no empirical evidence supporting the contention that 
cognitive tests for insanity are always sufficient, either because 
individuals who have impairments in impulse control are also 
cognitively impaired or because any impairment in control sufficient 
to justify exculpation necessarily is part and parcel of an impairment 
in rationality.  On the contrary, as discussed in Part I, FLD provides 
an excellent example of how individuals can be cognitively intact yet 
have substantial impairments in impulse control.  Indeed, “in a 
substantial number of cases, the difference between the ALI 
volitional test and the other insanity tests [is] clearly distinguishable 
to psychiatrists”243 and thus “the primary logical division between the 
volitional and cognitive standards appears to be powerful . . . .”244  A 
1991 study that examined 164 insanity evaluations (conducted by 
four forensic psychiatrists in one jurisdiction) found that seventy 
percent of defendants met the ALI cognitive test for insanity, whereas 
ninety-eight percent met the ALI control test.  Importantly, twenty-
four percent met only the control test.245  These results must be 
viewed with considerable caution, however, as their generalizeability 
may be limited given the small, restricted sample and the lack of 
independent measures of control or cognitive impairment.  A recent 
large-scale study is more instructive.  Professor Janet Warren and 
colleagues examined 5,175 insanity evaluations conducted over a ten-
year period in Virginia, which has both a cognitive and control test in 
                                                 
Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that a control test increases the 
risk of a defendant fabricating insanity). 
 240. REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 15, at 558. 
 241. See infra notes 336-343 and accompanying text. 
 242. Diamond, supra note 208, at 189. 
 243. Robert M. Wettstein, Edward P. Mulvey & Richard Rogers, A Prospective 
Comparison of Four Insanity Defense Standards, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 21, 24-25 (1991). 
 244. Id. at 26. 
 245. Id. at 24-25. 
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its insanity standard.246  Of those evaluations supporting a finding of 
insanity, both the cognitive and control tests were met in fifty-seven 
percent of cases, but in nine percent of cases only the control test was 
met.247  These two studies reveal that there is a group of criminal 
defendants who can avail themselves of an insanity defense only when 
a control test is available.  Moreover, in many cases the defendant 
had impairments in control as well as cognition, but undoubtedly in 
some cases (e.g. when defendants suffer from substantial FLD) the 
lack of control claim would be stronger than the cognitive 
impairment claim. 
Some have argued that control tests for insanity are misplaced 
because the effect of mental disorder on criminal behavior is best 
understood as a failure of rationality rather than of volitional control, 
and that irrationality is always at the heart of legitimate insanity–
based excuses for criminal behavior.  This claim has been advanced 
by several scholars,248 particularly in an influential series of articles by 
Professor Stephen Morse,249 a leading retributivist, who argues that 
“[v]irtually all cases of so-called control problems that plausibly raise 
a substantial question about the agent’s responsibility will prove on 
                                                 
 246. Janet I. Warren, Daniel C. Murrie, Preeti Chauhan, Park E. Dietz & James 
Morris, Opinion Formation in Evaluating Sanity at the Time of the Offense:  An Examination 
of 5175 Pre-Trial Evaluations, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 171, 172 (2004). 
 247. Id. at 182. 
 248. See R.A. Duff, Who is Responsible, for What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 
447-49 (2005) (equating an irresistible impulse to a lack of sound reasoning); MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 191 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (statement of 
Dr. Guttmacher) (stating that individuals laboring under an irresistible impulse 
“would in all probability be sufficiently out of touch with reality” to satisfy the 
McNaghten test); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy:  The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 783-86 (1985) (discussing similarities between “rationality” and 
“compulsion” defenses); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 56-63 (1991) (drawing connections among 
criminal responsibility excuses based on lack of cognition and lack of self-control); 
see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 208, at 75 (“Professor Jerome Hall speaks for those 
who see the ‘control tests’ as unnecessary if M’Naghten is properly construed.  
Starting from the premise that the human personality is integrated, he concludes 
that any case of impaired volition which can satisfy the ‘control’ rule will also be 
marked by the failure of knowledge demanded by M’Naghten, provided the word 
‘know’ is given a broad construction.”). 
 249. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 
(1994) [hereinafter Morse, Culpability and Control]; Stephen J. Morse, Brain and 
Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 544 (1996) [hereinafter Morse, Brain and Blame]; Stephen J. 
Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (2001) [hereinafter Morse, 
Responsibility]; Stephen J. Morse, From Sikora to Hendricks: Mental Disorder and Criminal 
Responsibility, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 129 (Lynda E. Frost & 
Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001) [hereinafter Morse, From Sikora to Hendricks]; Stephen 
J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People,  88 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2002) 
[hereinafter Morse, Uncontrollable Urges]; Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old 
Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:  BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE, 
157, 177-81 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) [hereinafter Morse, New Neuroscience]. 
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close analysis to be instances of irrationality, especially if the law 
continues to require that an abnormality is present.”250  Professor 
Morse explains: 
Many people believe, for example, that a compulsion theory 
explains the control test for legal insanity.  One metaphorical 
notion is that some abnormal mental or emotional states act like an 
internal gun to the head, even if these people seem otherwise 
rational.  Consider, for example, the pedophile, whose allegedly 
abnormal desire for sexual contact with a child may make the 
temptation feel irresistible, but who is clearly rational . . . . 
. . . . 
Impulse control disorders are an established category of mental 
disorders . . . some of which, such as intermittent explosive 
disorder, kleptomania, pathological gambling, and pyromania, may 
produce behavior for which the agent will seek an excuse.  
Moreover, impulsive behavior is blamed for much criminal conduct 
and other antisocial behavior . . . . Human beings incontrovertibly 
can be subject to momentary and apparently capricious passions 
that leave them feeling subjectively unfree and that seem to 
compromise their ability to control themselves.251 
Clearly, Professor Morse is referring here to compulsions, extreme 
desires, or inner cravings,252 not the inability to inhibit highly 
impulsive, reactive episodic behavioral responses due to substantial 
FLD,253 a very different kind of impairment.  Professor Morse opines, 
however, on how difficult it is to find a case having “coercive” 
features, but where the defendant was substantially rational: 
[I]n virtually all cases in which a defendant presents a plausible 
claim for a pure control excuse, careful analysis demonstrates that 
the claim collapses into an irrationality claim and should be 
                                                 
 250. Morse, From Sikora to Hendricks, supra note 249, at 162. 
 251. Id. at 136, 153 (internal citations omitted). 
 252. See Morse, New Neuroscience, supra note 249, at 178-79 (emphasis added). 
 253. It should be noted that the Automatism Defense, which is predicated on a 
claim that the offense committed was an involuntary act (i.e., reflexive or 
unconscious), would not apply in these situations.  See, e.g., Deborah Denno, Crime 
and Consciousness:  Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 282-85 (2002-03) 
(discussing involuntary acts and criminal responsibility); Donald Apostle, The 
Unconsciousness Defense as Applied to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in a Vietnam Veteran, 8 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 426, 430 (1980) (arguing that the automatism 
defense should apply to some actions of Vietnam veterans suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder).  Typically, the FLD defendant did not lack conscious 
control of his or her bodily movements that produced the physical act constituting 
the offense. 
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adjudicated on that basis.  In sum, fair criminal law does not 
require a control or volitional test for excuse.254 
Yet, as we have seen, neuroscience research and clinical case 
examples demonstrate the reality of rationality in the absence of 
behavioral control in some individuals who suffer from substantial 
frontal lobe dysfunction.255  As Professors Donald Stuss and Frank 
Benson put it, FLD produces “a curious dissociation between 
knowing and doing.”256 
a.  The possibility of more expansive cognitive tests 
In his recent essay Brain and Blame, Professor Morse again claims, 
and specifically with respect to defendants who suffer from FLD, that 
“[t]he real question is whether this impairment undermines 
rationality sufficiently to excuse the agent.”257 
Yet, although Professor Morse insists that criminal responsibility 
depends upon the “reasons for action,”258 he at times suggests an 
expansive application of “the rationality requirement”259 that may 
encompass some of the more extreme forms of FLD, by 
incorporating a cognitive test that exculpates for a lack of moral 
understanding.  (Such an approach, however, may be incongruent 
with the “moral wrongfulness” tests found in existing cognitive 
standards for insanity, which some jurisdictions construe as requiring 
                                                 
 254. Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 289, 295 (2003). 
   255.   See supra notes 53-157 and accompanying text. 
 256. Stuss & Benson, supra note 104, at 18. 
 257. Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 542. 
Whatever the causes of human action may be, they will ultimately be 
expressed through reasons for action, which are the true objects of 
responsibility analysis.  Suppose, for example, that a confirmed lesion, such 
as a tumor, is a but-for cause of behavior. . . .  Make the further, strong 
assumption that once the tumor is removed, the probability that this agent 
will reoffend drops to zero.  Although one’s strong intuition may be that this 
agent is not responsible for the undesirable behavior, the given assumptions 
do not entail the conclusion that the agent should be excused.  The 
undesirable behavior is human action, not a literally irresistible 
mechanism . . . . 
. . . . 
Suppose, for example, that the tumor . . . makes the agent irritable or 
emotionally labile. . . .  [T]hese people would not be excused if they 
offended while in an uncharacteristic emotional state, unless that state 
sufficiently deprived them of rationality. 
Id. at 535-36.  As I argue below, however, though one could characterize the impulsive 
and more or less automatic behavioral responding of frontally-damaged individuals 
as a failure of rationality, not only is such a characterization a stretch, but it fails to fit 
within the framework of existing cognitive tests for insanity. 
 258. Id. at 536. 
 259. See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 249, at 1635 (suggesting that a 
rationality standard could excuse psychopaths). 
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a delusional belief by the defendant that society would have condoned, 
on moral grounds, his or her criminal act.)260  In suggesting, for 
example, that the psychopath may be excused under cognitive (or 
“rationality”) tests for insanity, Professor Morse wonders “whether the 
law should adopt a standard of rationality that is ‘thin’ . . . or, . . . a 
standard that is ‘thick,’ requiring moral content in addition.”261  
“Viewed thusly, the psychopath seems ‘morally insane,’ unable 
successfully to reason practically about moral issues.”262 
In a similar vein, one could characterize the impulsive and more or 
less automatic behavioral responding of frontally-damaged 
defendants as reflecting a failure of rationality, since the “rational” 
part of the brain (the frontal lobes) was unable to engage in 
considered reflection and exert executive inhibitory control over the 
primitive, emotional brain (the amygdala and limbic system).  As 
Professor Morse puts it, “if the terror of the choice set renders the 
agent ‘unable to think,’ such that no choice is possible, this is a 
rationality defect.”263  Yet such a characterization seems forced, 
conflating the meanings of “impulse”264 and “rationality.”265  Under 
                                                 
 260. See supra note 221. 
 261. Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 249, at 1636. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1604. 
 264. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an impulse as “mental incitement . . . 
a sudden desire or tendency to act without reflection.”  THE OXFORD ENGLISH REFERENCE 
DICTIONARY 710-11 (Judy Pearsall & Bill Trumble eds., 2d ed. 1996) (1995) (emphasis 
added).  See, e.g., Rollins v. Commonwealth, 151 S.E.2d 622, 625 (Va. 1966) (“The 
word ‘impulse’ implies that which is sudden, spontaneous, unpremeditated.”). 
As one commentator points out: 
“Impulsivity” has not been comprehensively, clearly, or even consistently 
defined.  Most definitions, however, contrast impulsive behavior to planned 
behavior: “We may define the term impulse for our purposes as the generally 
unpremeditated welling-up of a drive toward some action that usually has the 
qualities of hastiness, lack of deliberation, and impetuosity.” 
A review of WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976) 
indicates that in common usage, in order to be called “impulsive” a person 
may manifest one of three quite different characteristics: 
1. Acting momentarily, and in a way that is inconsistent with the prevailing 
behavior (i.e., manifesting behavior that can be described as whimsical, 
capricious, and even unpredictable); in this instance, behavior seems to 
represent a brief pulse or surge of energy, rather than a steady, consistent 
drive. 
2. Generally acting, or being prone to act, with little apparent intellectual 
consideration of the appropriateness or consequences of so acting (i.e., 
manifesting behavior that could be described as spontaneous, impetuous, or 
rash). 
3. Generally acting, or being prone to act, as if driven or compelled to act 
in a particular kind of way (i.e., manifesting behavior that appears to be 
more reflexive than volitional, and manifesting what might be called an 
“irresistible impulse”). 
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Professor Morse’s approach, impulsive behavior is a subset of 
irrational behavior, and all that is needed to account for control 
problems is an expanded cognitive test for insanity.  “What is 
primarily required is simply a thick description of the agent’s 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning, and ultimately, of 
the agent’s reasons for action.”266  But, as Professor Christopher 
Slobogin asks, “[w]hy is irrationality . . . singled out?  What is it about 
irrationality that makes it the excusing condition?  The proponents of 
the Rationality Test do not give a sufficient answer to this question.”267 
According to Morse, an expanded cognitive test would be more 
parsimonious and workable than a separate control test, because 
jurors have a better grasp of what is meant by irrationality than they 
do lack of control.268  He asserts that the law’s concern must be the 
defendant’s ability to exercise practical reason, not his or her ability 
to exercise physiological control over his or her actions (unless there 
is a claim of involuntary action): 
No logical or legal reason prevents a court from understanding and 
interpreting “control” problems as rationality defects. . . .  Brief 
reflection on the concept of the person that law and morality 
employ and on the nature of law and morality suggests that the 
capacity for rationality must be the central condition of 
responsibility.  What distinguishes human beings from the rest of 
the natural world is that we are endowed with the capacity for 
reason, the capacity to use moral and instrumental reasons to guide 
our conduct. . . .  Law and morality consistently use the lack of 
capacity for reason as the central non-responsibility criterion.  It is 
a thoroughly familiar standard that is applicable in a wide variety of 
legal, moral, and everyday contexts.269 
                                                 
The professional literature reflects three basic assumptions about the nature 
of impulsivity:  An impulsive response is rapid, undesirable, and/or error-
prone; it is likely to occur in the presence of appealing stimuli; and/or it is 
likely to occur in the absence of strong cognitive control. 
E. Michael Coles, Impulsivity in Major Mental Disorders, in IMPULSIVITY:  THEORY, 
ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 180, 183 (Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson 
eds. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 265. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH REFERENCE DICTIONARY, supra note 264, at 1198, 
1203 (defining “rationality” and “reason”).  Irrationality is not the absence of 
considered judgment, but rather, it is judgment predicated on illogical or 
demonstrably false motives, beliefs, or causal reasoning. 
 266. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 249, at 1075. 
 267. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE:  LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 46 (2006) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, MINDING 
JUSTICE]. 
 268. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 249, at 1064-74. 
 269. Id. at 1064-67. 
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Morse says that “if one examines closely most cases of alleged ‘loss 
of control,’ they essentially raise claims that, for some reason, the 
agent could not ‘think straight’ or bring reason to bear under the 
circumstances.”270  But whether the frontal-lobe deficit is 
characterized as a rationality defect due to the “inability to think 
straight” or a control defect, the forensic mental health evidence 
used to support the insanity claim would likely be the same.  The 
claim would be that FLD affects practical reason by removing the 
opportunity for meaningful practical reason to occur. 
Perhaps in some ways, then, we are merely left with a semantic 
argument over whether the problem is labeled one of irrationality or 
lack of control.  But the difficulty—and perhaps this is what Morse 
aims to achieve—lies in the fact that the irrationality characterization 
would likely result in fewer successful insanity claims, due to “the 
slight of hand by which we are persuaded first that all exculpatory 
psychological conditions . . . are defects of rationality, and then . . . 
are not to be excused because they do not suffer either from a defect 
of perception or a defect of inference.”271  In other words, most 
people (including jurors) distinguish between impulsivity and 
irrationality—the former being acting without thinking, the latter 
being acting from wrongheaded thinking. 
Thus I, along with some other scholars,272 disagree with Morse that 
rationality provides a more readily understood umbrella concept for 
impulse control problems.  As Professor Michael Corrado observes, 
“[t]he notion that some people cannot control their behavior . . . is a 
notion with a foundation in common sense . . . [i]t will not easily be 
put down.”273  Under Morse’s formulation, all deficits: 
[A]re crammed into the category of irrationality; yet rarely are we 
told precisely what rationality or irrationality is for the purposes of 
the law.  Every condition that undermines responsibility is said to 
be a rationality defect; and then the category of rationality is so 
loosely defined that every troublesome case can be coerced into 
it. . . . The problem is that when we go looking for the cognitive 
defect we find none, and end up with Morse classifying most of 
these offenders as responsible for their behavior.274 
                                                 
 270. Id. at 1065. 
 271. Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 84 
(2005). 
 272. See id. (arguing that compulsions and addictions are properly understood in 
terms of control deficits). 
 273. Id. at 76. 
 274. Id. at 84, 89. 
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Except in cases involving extreme FLD or significant frontal lobe 
damage occurring early in life,275 frontally-damaged individuals 
typically do not lack an understanding of moral or legal wrongfulness 
(at least not to the degree that would be exculpatory), they lack the 
ability to exercise behavioral control, and thus would not meet a 
McNaghten-type cognitive test for insanity.  It is true that if we were to 
adopt an expansive definition of rationality, then FLD evidence for 
lack of control may loosely fit under the “appreciation standard” that 
many states have incorporated into their cognitive tests for insanity276 
(similar to that included in the ALI-MPC as well as the Federal Test, 
which asks whether the defendant “was unable to appreciate the 
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts”).277 It could be said 
that FLD defendants fail to “appreciate” the wrongfulness of their 
actions because their control mechanisms failed—i.e., the frontal 
lobes failed to exercise inhibitory control over the impulsive, 
emotional response generated by the amygdala, thus disallowing the 
defendant the opportunity to rationally appreciate the circumstances 
he or she faced.  The incorporation of an appreciation standard 
would not be the functional equivalent of a control test, however.278  
As Professor Corrado points out, those who conceptualize control 
problems as rationality defects usually end up concluding that the 
offender is criminally responsible.279  It is likely that juries would do 
the same, given common meanings of “understanding” and 
“appreciation.” 
Professor Morse does not proffer a compelling philosophical 
rationale for privileging rationality over control in insanity 
jurisprudence, particularly in view of the empirical and clinical 
evidence demonstrating the reality of rationality in the absence of 
behavioral control, as those terms are most commonly understood.  
At bottom, Professor Morse’s case against control tests appear to be 
based on what are, no doubt, compelling practical concerns:  (1) that 
the assessment of impulse control is too speculative,280 (2) that truly 
                                                 
 275. See supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text. 
 276. See State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 638-39 (1997) (explaining the appreciation 
standard as derived from the Model Penal Code). See generally SLOBOGIN, MINDING 
JUSTICE, supra note 267, at 42-46 (discussing application of the appreciation test). 
 277. 18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (2000). 
 278. See generally SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 267, at 42-46. 
 279. Corrado, supra note 271, at 89. 
 280. See, e.g., Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 546-47: 
The impressive theorizing and extensive medical and psychological 
findings . . . are unlikely to provide precise data concerning the level of [the 
defendant’s frontal lobe] impairment in the capacity for rational conduct.  
There is no quantitative scale with which to compare him to normal or 
REDDING.OFFTOPRINTER 9/18/2006  1:18:17 PM 
98 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1 
compelled or irresistible impulses cannot be distinguished from those 
merely difficult to resist,281 and, (3) that clinicians lack the ability to 
link a defendant’s brain dysfunction to the type and degree of 
behavioral dyscontrol he or she exhibited when committing the 
charged offense.282  These concerns, shared by other critics of control 
tests, are addressed in the next Section. 
2.  Impulse control disorders exist and can be assessed 
In large measure, the waning of control tests was fueled by 
longstanding skepticism over the very existence of irresistible 
impulses and the ability of mental health professionals to assess 
impulse control,283 and the attendant belief that control tests lead to 
erroneous insanity acquittals.  The reform of the Federal Test for 
insanity is instructive.  In 1984, Congress enacted the first federal 
                                                 
abnormal populations.  All we know is that there is some defect of 
indeterminate real-world effect.  Although the uncharacteristic homicidal 
behavior was not inconsistent with the defect, we cannot even be sure that 
the defect played a causal role in the conduct.  Opinions that it did or did 
not are both speculations, not confirmed scientific or clinical fact. 
 281. See, e.g., Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 249, at 1601 (stating that “it 
is impossible to differentiate ‘irresistible’ impulses from those simply not resisted,” 
and defining impulsivity as “a disposition or tendency to act with less forethought, or 
steeper time discounting, than most people of similar ability and knowledge”). 
 282. Professor Morse correctly points out that “it is a mistake to assume that 
specific brain pathology inevitably produces highly specific, complex intentional 
action. . . . [T]here is no region or site in the frontal lobes or anywhere else in the 
brain that controls specific, complex intentional actions.”  Morse, Brain and Blame, 
supra note 249, at 535.  But this does not serve as an indictment of control tests, as 
there likewise is no specific area of the brain responsible for “rationality” or the 
delusions and hallucinations of “irrationality.” 
 283. Morse, From Sikora to Hendricks, supra note 249, at 161 (“We cannot 
distinguish between irresistible impulses and those impulses simply not resisted.”); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. A (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1962) 
(Statement of Dr. Guttmacher) (“The problem is not primarily whether there are 
impulses and unconscious drives that overwhelm some mentally disordered 
individuals . . . . The real difficulty is to draw the nice line between those who can 
and who can not resist them.”); Keedy, supra note 202, at 987-88 (citing cases and 
authorities); see, e.g., Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 279 (1879) (“The possibility 
of the existence of such a mental condition is too doubtful.”); State v. Harrison, 15 
S.E. 982, 990 (W. Va. 1892) (Brannon, J.) (“I cannot see how a person who rationally 
comprehends the nature and quality of an act, and knows that it is wrong and 
criminal, can act through irresistible innocent impulse.”); People v. Hubert, 51 P. 
329, 331 (Cal. 1897) (“We do not know that the impulse was irresistible, but only that 
it was not resisted.”); Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 470 (N.Y. 1873) (“The 
vagueness and uncertainty of the inquiry [make the irresistible impulse test 
unworkable].”); Lady Barbara Wooten, The Insanity Defense.  By Abraham S. Goldstein, 
77 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026 (1968) (book review): 
[A] volitional test raises practical difficulties far more formidable even than 
those involved in a purely cognitive formula. . . .  [I]f I assert that I have an 
uncontrollable impulse to break shop windows, in the nature of the case no 
proof of uncontrollability can be adduced.  All that is known is that the 
impulse was not in fact controlled; and it is perfectly legitimate to hold the 
opinion that, had I tried a little harder, I might have conquered it. 
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insanity statute, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (“the Act”).  
The Act was passed by Congress in the wake of John Hinckley’s 
acquittal, under the American Law Institute–Model Penal Code 
standard then in place in the federal courts, for the shooting of 
President Reagan.284  The Act eliminated the control prong from the 
Federal Test,285 leaving in place only a cognitive “appreciation” test. 
[T]his had the ultimate effect of returning to a test that compelled 
the law to “do its punitive worst,” that had “the rigidity of an army 
cot and the flexibility of a Procrustean bed,” that retained the 
flavor “of the celebrated concepts of Hale and Coke of the 17th 
century,” and that was, simply, “bad psychiatry and bad law.”286 
However, both the American Psychiatric Association287 and the 
American Bar Association288 supported the change, asserting that 
impulse control cannot be reliably assessed and that the concept 
                                                 
 284. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE:  THE 
TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 121-27 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing questions raised by 
the Model Penal Code test and public discomfort with Hinckley’s acquittal); see also 
Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States-Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL 
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 55 (1987) (surveying insanity reform efforts after 
the Hinckley case).  It was reported that John Hinckley’s jury was persuaded to render 
an insanity verdict due, in part, to the CT scan of Hinckley’s brain, which the defense 
used to support its claim that Hinckley suffered from schizophrenia.  See Kulynych, 
Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, supra note 72, at 235-36. 
 285. The Federal Test for insanity provides: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at 
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the 
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to 
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (2000); United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 
1990).  The Act also required the defendant to establish insanity by clear and 
convincing evidence, recognized a special verdict of “not guilty by reason of 
insanity,” and created a comprehensive civil commitment procedure.  See 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 17 (2000). 
 286. Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”:  The Insanity 
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 1375, 1382 (1997) (quoting Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk:  
Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47 (1988)). 
 287. See INSANITY DEFENSE WORK GROUP, American Psychiatric Association Statement on 
the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983) asserting: 
[P]sychiatric information relevant to determining whether a defendant 
understood the nature of his act, and whether he appreciated its 
wrongfulness, is more reliable and has a stronger scientific basis than, for 
example, does psychiatric information relevant to whether a defendant was 
able to control his behavior.  The line between an irresistible impulse and an 
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and 
dusk. 
 288. The insanity defense standard in the 1989 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL 
HEALTH STANDARDS included only a cognitive, and not a volitional, test.  See Standard 
7-6.1 (1989) (Insanity) (“Experience confirms that there is still no accurate scientific 
basis for measuring one’s capacity for self control or for calibrating the impairment 
of such capacity.”). 
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lacked a scientifically sound basis, though neither organization presented 
any empirical data to support these claims.289 
Professor Richard Bonnie, of the University of Virginia School of 
Law, a key witness in the congressional hearings, argued that the 
irresistible impulse test should be eliminated from the Federal Test 
because “there is no scientific basis for measuring a person’s capacity for self 
control or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity.  There is, in short, 
no objective basis for distinguishing between . . . the impulse that was 
irresistible and the impulse not resisted”290 and no moral basis for excusing 
those with impaired control: 
Are there clinically identifiable cases involving defendants whose 
behavior controls were so pathologically impaired that they ought 
to be acquitted although their ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their actions was [un]impaired?  I do not think so.  
The most clinically compelling cases of volitional impairment 
involve the so-called impulse disorders—pyromania, kleptomania, 
and the like.  These disorders involve severely abnormal 
compulsions that ought to be taken into account in sentencing, but 
the exculpation of pyromaniacs would be out of touch with 
commonly shared moral intuitions.291 
Thus, Congress was persuaded that it was impossible to reliably 
establish whether a defendant could control his impulses, and that 
“moral mistakes would result from juror speculation regarding the 
defendant’s capacity for self control.”292  Indeed, in examining the 
legislative history of the Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[a] primary reason that the 
definition of insanity was altered by the Insanity Reform Act is that 
psychiatrists themselves are unable to agree upon the meaning of ‘an 
irresistible impulse.’”293 
Doubts about the conceptual validity of irresistible impulses long 
preceded the debate in the U.S. Congress, however.  In 1886, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina opined that “the difficulty would 
be great, if not insuperable, of establishing by satisfactory proof 
                                                 
 289. Richard Rogers, APA’s Position on the Insanity Defense, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 840, 
840-41 (1987).  The American Psychological Association, however, did not support 
the abolition of the volitional prong but instead urged that empirical research be 
conducted on the usefulness of the construct and its susceptibility to measurement.  
Id. at 841. 
 290. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 
196 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 291. Id. at 196-97. 
 292. Id.  at 196. 
 293. United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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whether an impulse was or was not ‘uncontrollable.’”294  A survey of 
psychiatrists in 1952 found that while most believed that some 
offenders were incapable of controlling their impulses, they also 
believed that the legal concept of an “irresistible impulse” was 
unsound and unworkable.295 The Supreme Court of Nevada rejected a 
control test in 1957, concluding: 
Among the psychiatrists themselves there is much doubt as to the 
validity of the concept of irresistible impulse in the sense of a loss 
of volitional control through mental disorder which does not 
necessarily affect the intellectual powers of the 
defendant. . . . Further, there is doubt among the psychiatrists as to 
their ability to distinguish between those cases where lack of 
volitional control is properly attributable to mental illness and 
those where it is due simply to a failure to resist that which could 
have been resisted had the power to resist been exercised.296 
These claims were made before much of the recent neuroscience 
research on frontal lobe dysfunction.  Through advances in forensic 
neuropsychological assessment and neuroimaging, the ability of 
mental health professionals to assess FLD and its impact on impulse 
control is now sufficiently established to merit the introduction of 
such evidence in support of an insanity defense under a control test. 
Consider, however, Professor Slobogin’s contention that:297 
[D]istinguishing between the irresistible impulse and the impulse 
that is not resisted is difficult, if not impossible.  Considerable 
research on impulsivity has taken place in recent years. . . .  
Compulsion is not susceptible to measurement.  If we nonetheless 
                                                 
 294. State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439, 445 (1886); see also Keedy, supra note 202, at 987 
n.196 (citing People v. Coleman, 1 N.Y. Crim. R.1, 3 (1881); State v. Levelle, 13 S.E. 
319, 321 (1890)). 
 295. Keedy, supra note 202, at 989. 
 296. Sollars v. State, 316 P.2d 917, 920 (Nev. 1957) (citing studies finding that 
psychiatrists were divided on the soundness of the irresistible impulse concept); see 
also Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 76 (Nev. 2001) (holding that Sollars still applies). 
 297. Professor Slobogin has proposed an “integrationist” (or mens rea) approach 
that abolishes the insanity defense and makes evidence of mental illness relevant to 
determinations of the defendant’s mens rea and beliefs about self-defense, coercion, 
or duress, thus limiting mentally-ill defendants to the same defenses available to 
other defendants.  See generally Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:  Recasting the 
Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000).  As Professor 
Slobogin points out, this scheme would exclude defenses based on impaired impulse 
control.  Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense:  
Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Trial, 
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 322-39 (2003) [hereinafter Slobogin, Integrationist Alternative].  
Kansas recently abolished the insanity defense in favor of a mens rea approach.  See 
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003).  See generally Jenny Williams, Note, Reduction 
in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants:  Kansas Upholds the Replacement of the 
M’Naughten Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity 
Defense, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 213 (2004). 
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engage in guessing about volitional impairment, and conclude, for 
instance, that some psychotic individuals are so compelled that 
they should be excused, then we probably have to excuse 
pedophiles and many other garden-variety criminals as well, 
because they also claim to experience very strong urges.298 
Again, as with those advanced by Professors Morse and Bonnie, 
these arguments are not germane to the type of control impairment 
characteristic of FLD. 
It is true, however, that many crimes are committed impulsively 
and that many criminal defendants are impulsive actors.  What, then, 
distinguishes the frontally-damaged defendant from others whose 
psychological makeup makes conforming to the law difficult?  
Substantial frontal lobe dysfunction represents a neurologically-based (and 
typically episodic) inability to exert behavioral control, and not merely extreme 
urges or desires, or the (relatively stable) personality trait of impulsivity that is 
present in a sizeable percentage of the non brain-injured general population.  
To be sure, desires, compulsions, and the personality trait of 
impulsivity also are the product of brain physiology, perhaps partly in 
the frontal lobes.  However, unlike substantial FLD,299 they typically 
do not produce highly impulsive response behaviors that occur 
without a meaningful opportunity for considered reflection.300  For 
example, while there is growing scientific evidence about the 
“disease” aspects of pedophilia, drug addiction, and kleptomania,301 
these disorders do not preclude the individual from entertaining 
reasoned considerations of moral choices.302 The impulsivity 
                                                 
 298. Slobogin, Integrationist Alternative, supra note 297, at 322-23.  Slobogin argues 
that: 
[G]auging the strength of criminal desires, or the weakness of the will to 
resist them, is a scientific impossibility at this point.  Despite repeated 
attempts to develop instruments that measure impulsivity, there is no 
generally accepted, or even partially accepted, formulation of the 
construct. . . . [I]nstruments for assessing volitional impairment are in a very 
primitive state. 
Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003-
04). 
 299. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (arguing that sub-clinical, low-
grade frontal lobe dysfunction should not be exculpatory). 
 300. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text (proposing that evidence that 
the defendant planned his or her criminal acts should preclude a finding of insanity 
based on a control test). 
 301. See, e.g., Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease—and it Matters, NAT’L 
INST. JUST. J. 2, 4 (Oct. 1998); Alan I. Leshner, Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and 
its Treatment, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1314-15 (1999). 
 302. Moreover, unlike many who suffer from FLD, those who suffer from addictive 
or compulsive disorders usually are aware of their problem.  Thus, it could be argued 
that they have the responsibility to seek treatment or take reasonable steps to prevent 
or reduce the behavior.  Although such behaviors may not be the product of free will 
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accompanying frontal lobe dysfunction is distinct from a disorder 
such as pathological gambling.  There is little opportunity for 
reasoned choice when the frontally-damaged individual responds 
reactively and impulsively when confronted with an emotionally 
provocative situation, whereas the gambler has the time and freedom 
to ponder whether or not to drive to the casino. 
Furthermore, 
[T]he practical difficulty of requiring the criminal justice system to 
distinguish between offenders who lack the capacity to control 
their actions and offenders who merely refrain from using their 
ability to control their actions is not insurmountable. . . .  [T]he 
legal system already imposes this line-drawing burden in 
innumerable other contexts.303 
“Whether the issue is ‘control’ or ‘knowledge’ or ‘intent’ or 
‘negligence,’ it will be impossible to draw absolute lines.”304  One 
distinction that can be made, of course, between these common legal 
inquiries and control inquiries is that the former focuses on 
conscious thought whereas control tests focus on the capacity to 
control actions.  All, however, are brain-based phenomena that 
cannot be measured directly, requiring strong inferences by the 
finder of fact.  In Professor Morse’s view, it is problematic that “there 
is no consensus about the conceptual meaning, the definition, or the 
measurement [of impulsivity].”305  Yet Morse also concedes that there 
is “[n]o consensual, technical definition of the capacity for 
rationality”306 (though he would rely on jurors’ common-sense 
understanding of rationality to make judgments about responsibility). 
Several older studies—with the waning of control tests, newer studies 
have not been conducted—suggest that clinicians can assess control 
impairments as reliably as cognitive impairments (though the studies 
must be viewed cautiously because of their small and limited samples 
and their lack of independent measures of control or rationality).  
These studies found that clinicians’ assessments of cognitive and 
volitional impairment had the same level of reliability (.75 to .80) and 
concordance (eight-eight percent) with the ultimate legal outcome.307  
In addition, psychiatrists had somewhat greater confidence in their 
evaluations of control than in their evaluations of cognitive 
                                                 
in the scientific sense, they still may warrant criminal sanction if the sanctions serve 
as meaningful deterrents.  See infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text. 
 303. Reider, supra note 219, at 308-09 (citing commentators). 
 304. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 208, at 77-78. 
 305. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 249, at 1060. 
 306. Id. at 1067. 
 307. See Rogers, supra note 289, at 842 (citing unpublished studies). 
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understanding,308 and clinicians gave almost twenty-four percent 
fewer insanity recommendations when relying on the control prong 
rather than the cognitive prong of the Model Penal Code Test for 
insanity.309 
To be sure, even with recent advances in neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological testing, the assessment of control is not an easy 
task.310  Yet, the availability of control tests should not turn on how 
satisfactorily we can measure control.  If lack of control is a reality for 
some defendants, such that they should not be held responsible for 
their conduct, then it is unjust to deny them an insanity defense only 
because mental health professionals have difficulty in measuring and 
quantifying control.  As the Parsons court noted in 1887, the difficulty 
in assessing impulse control is not a reason to reject control tests: 
It is no satisfactory objection to say that the rule above announced 
by us is of difficult application.  The rule in McNaghten’s case . . . is 
equally obnoxious to a like criticism.  The difficulty does not lie in 
the rule, but is inherent in the subject of insanity itself.311 
Perhaps the scalar quality of impulse control, as compared to the 
more dichotomous quality of rationality impairments (e.g., a 
psychotic delusion is present or it is not), is what many find 
troublesome about control tests.  As Morse puts it, we do not know 
“whether failure to resist is ‘controllable’ . . . [or] how many ‘desire 
units’ are necessary mechanically to flip the ‘action switch’.”312  
(Generally speaking, we seem to have difficulty in making scalar, as 
opposed to binary, moral judgments.)313 
                                                 
 308. See Wettstein, Mulvey & Rogers, supra note 243, at 24. 
 309. See Richard Rogers, Assessment of Criminal Responsibility:  Empirical Advances and 
Unanswered Questions, J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 73, 75, 79 (1987). 
 310. There are only a few measures available for assessing impulse control.  See 
Eric Hollander et al., Conceptualizing and Assessing Impulse-Control Disorders, in 
CLINICAL MANUAL OF IMPULSE-CONTROL DISORDERS 13-15 (Eric Hollander & Dan J. 
Stein eds., 2006) (summarizing impulse-control measures and characterizing their 
availability as “limited”). 
 311. Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 864-65 (Ala. 1887).  See also Keedy, supra note 202, 
at 990. 
Insanity in all its forms is frequently difficult to determine with certainty, and 
yet courts all recognize that, if an accused does not know right from wrong 
and does not know the nature of quality of the act charged he should not be 
punished.  Some physical diseases are difficult to prove, yet it is not likely 
that a court would refuse to receive evidence, otherwise admissible, of the 
existence of any of these diseases merely because of the difficulty of proof. 
Id. (quoting State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 185 (Utah 1931)) (citation omitted). 
 312. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 249, at 1061. 
 313. Cf. Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments, presented at the 
University of San Diego School of Law (2006) (arguing that “in the moral realm, our 
deontic judgments are usually [always?] binary. . . .  Yet the determination of an act’s 
deontic status frequently turns on the existence of properties that are matters of 
degree,” and asking “[w]hy aren’t our moral judgments of acts scalar in the way that 
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Thus, in theory, the assessment of cognitive impairment (typically 
due to psychosis) is more clear-cut than the scalar assessment of 
control.  In practice, however, determining whether a defendant’s 
delusions or hallucinations were directly responsible for the criminal 
conduct, and whether they distorted the defendant’s perceptions of 
legal or moral wrongfulness to the degree that he or she should not 
be held criminally responsible, also poses significant line-drawing 
problems.  Distinguishing between the irresistible impulse and the 
impulse not resisted may be no more nebulous an inquiry than 
determining whether an irrational perception made it impossible 
(versus merely difficult) for the defendant to grasp the wrongness of 
their actions.314  As Professor Slobogin explains, “just as the existence 
of a disorder cannot tell us how hard it is to do what is right, the 
existence or nonexistence of irrationality usually cannot tell us how 
hard it is to perceive what is right.”315  Merely because a defendant is 
delusional (and, thus, irrational) does not necessarily mean that the 
criminal act was also wholly the product of irrationality, for “psychosis 
may enhance and enact the drama already present, and the drama is 
not necessarily an innocent one.”316   
Indeed, even when psychiatrists first began to question the 
feasibility of assessing control, they voiced similar concerns about the 
assessment of rationality.  The 1985 Comments on the Model Penal 
Code note “the inability of the psychiatrist to determine the existence 
or the nonexistence of the individual’s capacity to distinguish right 
from wrong at the time of the crime.”317  Although Professor Morse 
allows that “[c]ases of impulse disorders and related diagnoses may 
be exceptions” to the rule that irrationality is the touchstone of 
virtually all legitimate insanity defenses, he nonetheless argues that 
even these disorders “are probably best characterized as cases of 
irrational desires.”318  Yet, the move to characterize control 
                                                 
the properties on which those judgments are based are scalar, so that acts, like states 
of affairs, can be morally better or worse rather than right or wrong?”). 
 314. SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 267, at 47-51 (providing examples of 
cases where both kinds of line-drawing prove difficult). 
 315. Id. at 51. 
 316. Id. (quoting DREW ROSS, LOOKING INTO THE EYES OF A KILLER:  A PSYCHIATRIST’S 
JOURNEY THROUGH THE MURDERER’S WORLD 87 (1998)). 
 317. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. A (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1962) (Statement of Dr. Guttmacher).  This comment, provided by Dr. Guttmacher, 
was based on his surveys of psychiatrists.  See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a 
Post- Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 626-27 (2005). 
 318. Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 249, at 1626 n.111. 
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impairments as rationality defects does nothing to solve the 
measurement problem.319 
In any case, the assessment of impulse control is conducted using 
the same principles of forensic assessment that are used when 
assessing cognitive impairment.320  The clinician diagnoses (through 
neuropsychological testing and possibly also neuroimaging) the 
predicate mental disease or defect (FLD), and evaluates the 
defendant’s account of the offense and the behavioral evidence 
surrounding it (along with the defendant’s past behavior), to infer 
whether the offense was committed impulsively and the role the 
defendant’s FLD likely played in its commission.  This is no different 
than the assessment of cognitive impairment:  the forensic mental 
health professional makes a diagnosis (typically of a psychotic 
condition involving delusions or hallucinations), and then evaluates 
the defendant’s behaviors and account of the offense to reach a 
determination as to whether those delusions or hallucinations likely 
affected the defendant’s reasoning at the time of the offense.  Rarely 
can we be certain that the offense was impulse rather than 
premeditated, or that it was the defendant’s FLD that caused him or 
her to react impulsively in a particular instance, though a 
convergence of test results along with relevant behavioral evidence 
might permit a reasonable inference.  It is equally true, however, that 
                                                 
 319. It is difficult to discern whether Professor Morse is arguing that it is only 
compulsive behaviors that are reducible to questions of rationality, or whether he 
believes that truly irresistible impulses exist, and, if so, whether they also are best 
characterized as a failure of rationality rather than control.  Morse most frequently 
uses the terms “coercive,” “compelled,” or “compulsions” when arguing against 
control tests.  See, e.g., id. at 1619-37.  At other times, however, he argues against 
control tests in the context of brain tumors, frontal lobe dysfunction, and other 
disorders that produce similar impulsive behavior.  See, e.g., Morse, Brain and Blame, 
supra note 249,  at 537-48 (arguing against the volitional impairment perspective in 
the case of “Spyder Cystkopf,” a murderer with a sub-arachnoid cyst and probably 
impaired frontal lobe functioning).  Citing Intermittent Explosive Disorder as one 
example, Professor Morse argues that: 
Cases of impulse disorders and related diagnoses may be exceptions, but 
these are probably best characterized as irrational desires . . . if there are 
situations of purely impulsive, thoughtless conduct in which the agent is 
incapable of any form of reflective awareness . . . there are clearly cases of 
irrationality by any reasonable rationality criteria. 
Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 249, at 1626.  Frontal lobe dysfunction is 
often diagnosed as Intermittent Explosive Disorder, see supra note 225, a disorder 
characterized by episodes of impulsive aggression. 
One must assume, therefore, that Morse is broadly opposed to volitional tests, 
whether the volitional impairment is arguably due to compulsions, extreme desires 
or irresistible impulses.  In his most recent writing, Professor Morse makes the defini-
tive statement that “lack of control can always be reduced to a cognitive deficiency.”  
Morse, Brain Overclaim, supra note 72, at 407 n.8  (emphasis added). 
 320. See generally KIRK HEILBRUN, PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 
ASSESSMENT (2001). 
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even when we are relatively certain that a defendant suffers from a 
psychotic condition impairing his or her rationality, rarely are we 
certain that the psychotic symptoms were directly responsible for the 
criminal conduct.321 
There are, however, some tools available to assist the forensic 
evaluator in determining whether an act was impulsive or 
premeditated.322  For example, Dr. Hall has developed an inventory 
for assessing how and whether a defendant’s FLD contributed to the 
criminal offense, by evaluating the defendant’s degree of self-control 
before, during, and after the offense (see Table 2).323 The protocol 
guides the forensic evaluator in assessing the defendant’s base rate 
for violence, diagnosing disorders in executive functions, assessing 
the defendant’s degree of dyscontrol during the commission of the 
offense, and linking the disorder to the defendant’s dyscontrol 
during the offense.  In assessing whether the offense was committed 
impulsively, factors to be considered are whether it had a predatory 
or reactive quality, the length of time between the trigger to violence 
and the offense, whether complex planning or behavior preceded 
the offense, and the flexibility of the defendant’s responses (see Table 
2).324  Evidence of planning or concealment is strong evidence cutting 
against a claim of impaired control.  The defendant’s history of 
violence is likewise analyzed to determine whether there is a pattern 
of impulsive or reactive versus instrumental or predatory violence.  
Importantly, the types of executive deficits and behavioral dyscontrol 
suggested by the defendant’s behaviors at the time of the offense should be 
                                                 
 321. SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 267, at 51. 
 322. See Ernest S. Barratt, M.S. Stanford, Alan R. Felthous & T.A. Kent, The Effects 
of Phenytoin on Impulsive and Premeditated Aggression:  A Controlled Study, 17 J. CLIN. 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 341, 341 (1997) (providing a semi-structured interview 
protocol to differentiate between impulsive and premeditated aggression); Ernest S. 
Barratt & Alan R. Felthous, Impulsive versus Premeditated Aggression:  Implications for 
Mens Rea Decisions, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 619, 626-27 (2003) (reporting techniques, 
including the use of interview protocols and electroencephalography, to differentiate 
between impulsive and premeditated aggression); Ernest S. Barratt et al., Neurological 
and Cognitive Psychophysiological Substrates of Impulsive Aggression, 41 BIOOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 1045, 1045 (1997) (reporting study showing clear differences in the 
electroencephalography patterns of inmates exhibiting impulsive versus 
premeditated aggression). 
 323. Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology, supra note 41, at 37; Harold V. Hall, 
Linkage of Evaluation and Crime Behavior: Inventory of Defendant Competencies and Self-
Control, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW APPLICATIONS 
166-70 (Harold V. Hall & Robert J. Sbordone eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hall, 
Evaluation and Crime].  There is, however, apparently no data available on the validity 
or reliability of the inventory. 
 324. See, e.g., People v. Craig, No. RIF089100, 2003 WL 1735544, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 2, 2003) (stating that experts testified that evidence of planning by the 
defendant suggested that his criminal behavior was not due to FLD). 
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roughly equivalent in type and degree as the deficits shown through 
neuropsychological testing.  As with other mental disorders, there are 
standard techniques and criteria available for reliably assessing 
whether defendants are malingering (faking) FLD symptoms.325 (For 
a summary of techniques available for assessing FLD, see Appendix A—
Forensic Assessment of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 325. See Daniel J. Slick et al., Diagnostic Criteria for Malingered Neurocognitive 
Dysfunction:  Proposed Standards for Clinical Practice and Research, 13 CLINICAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 545, 561 (1999). 
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Table 2. Self-control of instant violence behavior 
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Synthesizing  all self-control factors, judge whether the highest type of self-control called 
for at each of the levels has been attained.  The suggested degree of maximum self-control 
this implies for the instant offense is presented on the left margin.  Generic examples of 
each level of self-control are presented for each type. 
Reprinted from Harold V. Hall, Linkage of Evaluation and Crime Behavior: Inventory of Defendant 
    Competencies and Self-Control, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW 
      APPLICATIONS 172 (Harold V. Hall & Robert J. Sbordone eds., 1998).  
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Professor Morse, however, has argued that testimony from mental 
health experts is not helpful to judges and juries, particularly on 
questions of control.326  This claim is belied by a recent study finding 
that trial judges rated testimony about clinical diagnoses, as well as 
clinical opinions that link the diagnosis to the relevant legal standard, 
as among the most valuable kinds of evidence in insanity cases.327  
According to Professor Morse, however, “[t]he law’s central concern 
is how [a defendant] performs in the real world, not the structure of 
his brain or how he performs on various tests.”328  “Lack of control 
can only be finally demonstrated behaviorally, by evaluating action.  
Although neuroscience evidence may surely provide assistance in 
performing this evaluation, neuroscience could never tell us how 
much control ability is required for responsibility.  That question is 
normative, moral, and ultimately, legal.”329 
To be sure, neuropsychological or neuroimaging evidence cannot 
establish a defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility, which is a legal 
determination, not a medical one.  Taken together, however, 
behavioral, neuropsychological, and/or neuroimaging evidence can 
paint a rich portrait of a defendant’s frontal lobe dysfunction and its 
causal role in the criminal behavior in question.  Consider the case 
with which this Article began—the forty-year-old school teacher 
whose sexual offending ended when his frontal lobe brain tumor was 
removed.330  This is an unusually stark case, to be sure, but one that 
illustrates the power and persuasiveness of neuroscience evidence.  
Without the neuroimages showing the brain tumor together with the 
behavioral evidence correlating its presence and absence with the 
defendant’s sexual offending, a judge or jury would be left wholly to 
                                                 
 326. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, & Science:  An Analysis of Mental 
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 554-60 (1978) (asserting that who the law deems 
“crazy” is a social and moral judgment).  But see Richard Bonnie & Christopher 
Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process:  The Case for 
Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 452-66 (1980) (arguing that clinical 
information can be relevant and helpful in three contexts: diagnosis, mental 
elements of offenses and explaining certain behavior).  In a more recent writing, 
Morse concedes that “abnormal clinical, laboratory, and psychological test findings 
may add plausibility to claims concerning impairments in the capacity for rational 
conduct. . . .”  Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 545 (emphasis added). 
 327. Richard E. Redding, Marnita Y. Floyd & Gary Hawk, What Do Judges and 
Lawyers Think About What Mental Health Experts Say in Court?  A Survey of the Courts and 
Bar, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 583, 589-92 (2001). 
 328. Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 545. 
 329. Morse, New Neuroscience, supra note 249, at 179; see also Jacob R. Waldbauer & 
Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Divergence of Neuroscience and Law, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 357, 
363 (2001) (arguing that neuroscience evidence ultimately cannot answer moral and 
legal questions about criminal responsibility). 
 330. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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speculate about possible reasons for the defendant’s aberrant 
behavior. 
Finally, concerns often voiced about the insanity defense 
generally—that defendants can readily fake insanity and that there 
are too many insanity acquittals, are myths that have long since been 
debunked.  Research has consistently shown that:  (1) insanity rarely 
is feigned (in fact, feigning sanity is far more common), and 
malingering (faking) is almost always detected;331 (2) insanity is pled 
in less than one percent of all felony cases; (3) less than twenty-five 
percent of those who plead insanity are found Not Guilty by Reason 
of Insanity (NGRI);332 (4) many defendants found NGRI spend as 
long or longer in a mental hospital than the prison term they would 
have received if found guilty;333 and (5) when NGRI acquittees 
ultimately are released, their recidivism rate is less than that of 
convicted felons.334  Moreover, a 2005 national study found statistically 
identical success rates of insanity pleas when comparing ALI-MPC (a 
test that includes both cognitive and control prongs) and McNaghten 
jurisdictions.335 
3.  Control tests for insanity do not threaten the law’s free-will assumption 
For some, control tests for insanity, which “directly pose the 
question of whether a person could control his or her behavior,”336 
run counter to the law’s assumption that rational actors have free-will 
and should bear responsibility for their actions.337  In Professor 
                                                 
 331. See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 236-47 
(1994) (reviewing studies and commentary refuting the myth that defendants 
successfully feign insanity).  
 332. See Randy Borum & Soloman M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity 
Defense and Attempted Reforms:  Evidence Toward Informed Policy, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
375, 378 (1999) (citing studies and arguing that the publicity from the winning cases 
make the public believe that the insanity defense is more successful than it actually 
is); Eric Silver, C. Cirincione & Henry J. Steadman, Demythologizing Inaccurate 
Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 66-68 (1994); Stephen G. 
Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses, 
Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 
1723 (2005) (finding average occurrence rate of 0.87% and average success rate of 
23.55%). 
 333. See Borum & Fulero, supra note 332, at 379 (citing studies). 
 334. See id. (stating that only twenty-four percent of NGRI acquittees are 
rearrested, as opposed to twenty-seven percent of released felons). 
 335. Valdes, supra note 332, at 1724.  However, studies conducted in varying 
jurisdictions during the 1970s and 1980s produced mixed findings, with some 
finding no change in the rate of insanity acquittals after a jurisdiction adopted a 
control test and others finding an increase in the acquittal rate.  See Wettstein, 
Mulvey & Rogers, supra note 243, at 22 (reviewing studies). 
 336. REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 15, at 558. 
 337. See Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the 
Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 16 (2005) (concluding that states “often 
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Morse’s view, insanity defenses based on impaired control (whether 
due to FLD or other brain disorders)338 frequently are exemplars of 
what he calls “the fundamental psycholegal error,” which is the 
erroneous assumption that the identification of a brain-based cause 
for behavior is necessarily exculpatory.339  As Morse correctly points 
out, “causation can not per se be an excuse . . . because all behavior is 
caused and thus all behavior would have to be excused.”340 
But importantly, control tests do not rest on any particular claims 
about whether human beings have free-will or causal agency.  The 
moral case for control tests does not rest on the claim that the 
behavior was determined or caused, but rather, on the claim that it is 
unfair to blame and punish individuals who lacked substantial control 
over their behavior at the time of the offense.  As Professor Corrado 
explains, 
                                                 
specifically expressed a desire to avoid legitimizing determinism by adding a 
volitional prong”); Cole v. State, 128 A.2d 437, 439 (Md. 1957) (“A modification of 
the existing rule to relieve an accused of the criminal consequences of his acts . . . 
would . . . remove responsibility for a crime where there is some element of 
determinism in the case . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 451 A.2d 1344, 1349 
(Pa. 1982) (“The concept of irresistible impulse . . . is grounded in determinism.  It 
denies choice.  For this reason, it is an alternate test of sanity in those jurisdictions, 
not including Pennsylvania, which accept it.”). 
At least to the extent that the criminal law is retributive in nature, it is based on the 
assumption that people have free-will.  See generally Cotton, supra, at 16 (documenting 
how the free-will assumption pervades the criminal law); GARY B. MELTON ET AL., 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:  A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 8-9 (2d ed. 1997) (comparing the law’s free-will 
assumption with the deterministic assumption of the behavioral sciences). 
 338. See Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 537-48 (discussing the case of 
“Spyder Cystkopf,” a murderer who had a sub-arachnoid cyst, which probably 
impaired frontal lobe functioning). 
 339. Morse, New Neuroscience, supra note 249, at 180. 
 340. Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 537-48. 
The mind is what the brain does, and the brain is a causal machine [that 
follows the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology].  Consequently, 
deliberations, beliefs, decisions, and ensuing behavior are the outcome of 
causal processes. . . .  The “user illusion,” nevertheless, is that a decision is 
created independently of neuronal causes, by one’s very own “act of will.”  
Some philosophers—usually called libertarians—resolutely believe that 
voluntary decisions actually are created by will, free of causal antecedents.  
Like flat-earthers and creationists, libertarians glorify their scientific naiveté 
by labeling it transcendental insight. 
Patricia S. Churchland, Brain-Based Values, 93 AM. SCIENTIST 356, 356-57 (2005) 
(emphasis in original). 
As the famous trial lawyer (a well -known hard determinist) Clarence Darrow 
explained, 
All people are products of two things, and two things only–their heredity and 
their environment.  And they act in exact accord with the heredity which 
they took from all the past, and for which they are in no wise responsible, 
and the environment, which reaches out to the farthest limit of all life that 
can influence them.  We all act from the same way. 
Clarence Darrow, supra note 18, at 98. 
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When the defense attorney claims that her client cannot help 
himself . . . she is not claiming that the offender’s action should be 
excused because it is caused.  She is not claiming that he is an 
automaton.  She is claiming instead that the offender is unlike 
other human beings in [that] . . . conforming his actions to the law 
is so difficult for him that he ought to be excused and 
committed . . . .341 
There is the worry, however, that control tests provide a ready 
opportunity for mental health experts to “smuggle in alleged 
mechanistic explanations and completely irrelevant talk of free-will 
along with question-begging and conclusory expert evidence [about 
lack of control].”342  Professor Morse claims that: 
[a]ll too often, “expert” opinions about whether an agent was 
capable of self-control are based on a purely common-sense 
evaluation that anyone could perform, informed implicitly or 
explicitly by the expert’s private, subjective moral view about 
whether the agent should be held responsible.  They are clearly not 
based on expert, scientifically, or clinically grounded 
understandings or measurements of lack of control.343 
This need not be the case, however, if prosecutors (when raising 
evidentiary challenges) and judges (when making admissibility 
rulings) do their jobs properly.  Such evidence is irrelevant under a 
control test, and would likely fail to satisfy the prevailing reliability 
standards (Frye or Daubert)344 for admitting scientific evidence. 
Even if control tests are seen by some as a threat to law’s free-will 
assumption, fortunately, the revival of control tests do not require us 
to resolve the age-old debate over free-will versus determinism.345  The 
concept of free-will is difficult to defend on scientific grounds (few 
behavioral scientists give it credence),346 especially in view of ongoing 
                                                 
 341. Corrado, supra note 271, at 80. 
 342. E-mail from Stephen Morse, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania to 
Richard E. Redding (Feb. 5, 2006)(on file with author). 
 343. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 249, at 1062-63. 
 344. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. 
 345. See generally infra note 346. 
 346. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, Some Contrarian Concerns About Law, Psychology and 
Public Policy, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 565, 573 (2002) (stating that “[f]ree will is a legal 
fiction, but an enduring one impervious to the findings of science”); Lee Ross & 
Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 
N.W. U. L. REV. 1081, 1108, 1114 (2003).  
To academically trained social psychologists, much of the discussion about 
bad and good excuses seems to hinge on dubious distinctions and 
incoherent notions of behavioral causation and personal agency. . . .  The 
workings of the criminal justice system should not continue to be guided 
by . . . comforting but largely fanciful notions of free will, any more than it 
should be guided by once common notions about witchcraft or demonic 
possession. 
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advances in neuroscience that trace behaviors to particular structural 
and functional aspects of brain functioning, thus demonstrating  the 
metaphysical reality that the human mind is derived from the 
functioning of the physical brain.347  But the scientific account of a 
                                                 
JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT:  DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL 
SYSTEM? 40 (1997) (stating that free-will is a “convenient fiction”). 
Thus, for many, though by no means all behavioral scientists, see DANIEL C. 
DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM:  THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 50-73, 131-64 
(1984), the fact that behavior is casually determined necessarily implies the non-
existence of free-will.  But not so for philosophers.  The view called compatibilism, 
which has many adherents among philosophers, holds that determinism and free-will 
coexist and are compatible.  Incompatibilism represents the opposite philosophical 
view.  Galen Strawson, Free Will, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (E. Craig 
ed. 2004), available at http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/vo14.  Moreover, most 
philosophers insist that the question of whether free-will is the philosopher’s prov-
ince and is not a question that science can answer.  Much of the difficulty lies in con-
ceptualizing exactly what one means by “free will” and whether determinism and 
free-will are compatible.  Most scientists who argue against free-will are presupposing, 
a priori, an incompatibilist view of free-will. 
 347. Professors Greene and Cohen argue that modern neuroscience will, in the 
long run, change the way in which the law views and responds to criminal offenders: 
At some time in the future we may have extremely high-resolution scanners 
that can simultaneously track the neural activity and connectivity of every 
neuron in a human brain, along with computers and software that can 
analyse and organize these data.  Imagine, for example, watching a film of 
your brain choosing between soup and salad.  The analysis software 
highlights the neurons pushing for soup in red and the neurons pushing for 
salad in blue.  You zoom in and slow down the film, allowing yourself to trace 
the cause-and-effect relationships between individual neurons – the mind’s 
clockwork revealed in arbitrary detail.  You find the tipping-point moment at 
which the blue neurons in your prefrontal cortex out-fire the red neurons, 
seizing control of your pre-motor cortex and causing you to say, ‘I will have 
the salad, please’ 
. . . . 
Suppose a man has killed his wife in a jealous rage.  Will jurors of the future 
wonder whether the defendant acted in the moment of his own free will?  Will 
they wonder if it was really him who killed his wife rather than his 
uncontrollable anger?  Will they ask whether he could have done otherwise?  
Whether he really deserves to be punished, or if he is just a victim of 
unfortunate circumstances?  We submit that these questions, which seem so 
important today, will lose their grip in an age when the mechanical nature of 
human decision-making is fully appreciated.  The law will continue to punish 
misdeeds, as it must for practical reasons, but the idea of distinguishing the 
truly, deeply guilty from those who are merely victims of neuronal 
circumstances will, we submit, seem pointless. 
. . . . 
Neuroscience is unlikely to tell us anything that will challenge the law’s 
stated assumptions.  However, we maintain that advances in neuroscience 
are likely to change the way people think about human action and criminal 
responsibility by vividly illustrating lessons that some people appreciated 
long ago.  Free will as we ordinarily understand it is an illusion generated by 
our cognitive architecture.  Retributivist notions of criminal responsibility 
ultimately depend on this illusion, and, if we are lucky will give way to 
consequentialist ones, thus radically transforming our approach to criminal 
justice.  At this time, the law deals firmly but mercifully with individuals 
whose behavior is obviously the product of forces that are ultimately beyond 
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deterministic universe does not erase the need for accountability and 
criminal sanctions.  On the contrary, a control test in insanity 
jurisprudence retains—indeed, enhances—the utilitarian work of 
law’s free-will assumption, which is the use of sanctions to deter 
criminal behavior.  Though neuroscience may explain the causal 
brain mechanisms underlying certain types of criminal behavior, and 
in some cases even provide compelling moral exculpation, criminal 
sanctions may nonetheless have general or specific deterrent effects 
on some of the same offenders by acting as environmental shapers of 
brain functioning.  Under this utilitarian analysis, the insanity 
defense provides the prototypical example of “a psychological 
explanation that nullifies responsibility,” because the “inhibitory brain 
systems” of insane individuals do not respond to the typical deterrence effects of 
criminal sanctions.348  Like the cognitively impaired, those lacking control are 
unlikely to be deterred. 
Thus, defendants with significant FLD who satisfy a control test for 
insanity may require incapacitation in a psychiatric hospital and the 
limited treatments available to ameliorate their maladaptive 
behaviors.349  But punishing such persons is inappropriate under a 
                                                 
their control.  Some day, the law may treat all convicted criminals this way.  
That is, humanely. 
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN 218, 224 (S. Zeki & O. Goodenough eds., 2006).  As 
John Steinbeck put it, “There ain’t no sin and there ain’t no virtue.  There’s just stuff 
people do”.  Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 728 (quoting JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES 
OF WRATH 28 (1939)). 
 348. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK STATE 183 (2002) (emphasis added); see also 
Greene & Cohen, supra note 347, at 222.  Some older case law expressed the concern 
that legal recognition of the irresistible impulse defense would decrease the 
deterrent effect of the criminal law.  See Keedy, supra note 202, at 987-88 (discussing 
cases from the 1800s). 
 349. Although frontal lobe brain damage cannot be repaired, behavioral 
modification and psychosocial education programs are available to help defendants 
compensate for the behavioral and decision making impairments accompanying 
FLD.  See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, Rehabilitation of Persons with 
Traumatic Brain Injury, 16 N.I.H, Consensus Statement 1-41 (1998), available at 
http://consensus.nih.gov/1998/1998TraumaticBrainInjury109PDF.pdf; Paul W. 
Burgess & Ian H. Robertson, Principles of the Rehabiliation of Frontal Lobe Function, in 
PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL LOBE FUNCTION 557 (Donald T. Stuss & Robert T. Knight eds., 
2002).  Pharmacological treatment with antidepressants, mood stabilizers, sedating 
medications, or Ritalin may reduce impulsive aggression.  See Emil F. Coccaro & 
Melany Denehy, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, in CLINICAL MANUAL OF IMPULSE-
CONTROL DISORDERS, supra note 310, at 19, 28-32 (describing treatments); Pincus, 
Aggression and Frontal Lobes, supra note 6, at 550-555.  In addition, FLD often exists 
alongside substance abuse or other mental health problems that exacerbate 
symptoms.  Treatment of these co-occurring disorders can alleviate some of the 
behavioral problems associated with FLD.  Evidence of FLD may be relevant to a 
court’s consideration of treatment issues at sentencing, particularly in jurisdictions 
that require judges to do so.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2523 (2005) 
(“Consideration of Mental Illness in Sentencing”). In State v. Harper, for instance, the 
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utilitarian analysis, because their neurologically-based behavioral 
disinhibition cannot be deterred through criminal sanctions.  And, 
an impairment in control also nullifies responsibility under a 
retributive analysis.  As we have seen, the truly volitionally impaired 
are unable to control their behavior, just as the cognitively impaired 
are unable to control their irrationality. 
Some have suggested, however, that people with FLD have a duty 
to take preventive measures to avoid placing themselves in situations 
that might trigger behavioral disinhibition and that they bear 
responsibility for their criminal acts when they fail to do so.350  The 
problem with this argument is that “responsibility and self-reflection 
are not disembodied, ethereal processes, but are firmly rooted in the 
brain.”351  That is, in many cases, the FLD that caused the behavioral 
disinhibition also impaired the individual’s social judgment and 
ability to adjust his or her behavior to changing circumstances.352  Nor 
can one always anticipate or avoid provocative situations, particularly 
when one’s judgment is substantially impaired in the first place. 
Another familiar objection is that FLD-based theories of insanity 
(and mitigation) fail to explain why most individuals with FLD do not 
engage in criminal conduct.353  Two scientific facts belie this 
appealing, common-sense argument.  First, a substantial number of 
persons with FLD do exhibit impulsive and aggressive behavior, albeit 
                                                 
defense and prosecution experts testified about the need for testing to determine the 
defendant’s risk for future violence, whether he should be committed to a maximum 
security facility, and whether his FLD could be treated.  922 P.2d 383, 388 (Idaho 
1996). 
 350. Cf. Duff, supra note 248, at 448 n.17 (arguing that an individual “afflicted by 
an irresistible impulse” has a responsibility to take “such steps as he can to deal with 
his pathological impulses”); CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS & SALLY SATEL, ONE NATION 
UNDER THERAPY:  HOW THE HELPING CULTURE IS ERODING SELF-RELIANCE 102 (2005); 
Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 249, at 1071: 
It is the citizen’s duty in such circumstances to take all reasonable steps to 
prevent oneself from acting wrongly in an irrational state in the future, 
including drastically limiting one’s life activities if such an intrusive step is 
necessary to prevent serious harm.  If the agent does not take such steps, the 
agent may indeed be responsible, even if at the moment of acting he suffers 
from substantially compromised capacity for rationality. 
 351. Raine, Psychopathy, Violence, and Brain Imaging, supra note 31, at 51 (emphasis 
added). 
 352. See supra notes 107-155 and accompanying text. 
 353. See, e.g., Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 249, at 540 (observing that most 
people with frontal lobe abnormalities do not commit homicide); SOMMERS & SATEL, 
supra note 350, at 90 (arguing, with respect to neuroscience evidence suggesting a 
link between adolescent frontal lobes immaturity and delinquent behavior, that 
“even if we accept that almost all teenagers have relatively immature brains, [those 
arguing that this diminishes adolescent responsibility] need[] to explain why so few 
engage in impulsive criminality”). 
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perhaps not rising to the level of detectable or serious criminality.354  
Second, modern criminological research has shown that criminal 
behavior is the product of a combination of risk factors inherent in 
the individual and environment.355  Criminal behavior occurs when a 
tipping point is reached vis-à-vis the accumulation or strength of risk 
factors present in a particular individual (e.g., genetic predisposition, 
FLD, mental illness) and environmental (e.g., poor parental 
supervision, history of abuse, living in a high-crime neighborhood) 
context.  This explains why only a minority of persons with FLD 
engage in criminal behavior—those having substantial frontal lobe 
dysfunction that particularly affects behavioral control and/or a 
particular combination or strength of risk factors that tip the 
individual into criminal offending. 
CONCLUSION 
Brain imaging research on violence and psychopathy is troubling to 
some because it challenges the way we conceptualize crime.  It 
questions our treatment of violent [criminals] in just the same way 
that we now look back 200 years and question the way in which the 
mentally ill were kept in shackles and chains, treated little better 
than animals.  The history of civilization has shown that as time 
progresses, society becomes more ennobled, wiser, and humane.  
In 200 years from now, will we have reconceptualized . . . serious 
criminal behavior as a clinical disorder with its roots in early social, 
biological, and genetic forces beyond the individual’s control?356 
This sentiment, expressed by Professor Raine, a leading researcher 
on the biology of violence, reflects what some consider to be the 
misplaced “medicalization of morality.”357  The human need to exact 
punishment on wrongdoers is a strong one.358  We want to hold 
                                                 
 354. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
 355. See generally David DeMatteo & Geoffrey Marczyk, Risk Factors, Protective Factors, 
and the Prevention of Antisocial Behavior Among Juveniles, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: 
PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 19 (Kirk Heilbrun, N.E. Sevin Goldstein 
& Richard E. Redding eds., 2005); JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK 
ASSESSMENT:  THE MCARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001); 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 101-81; 357-
403 (1993), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1861.html#toc. 
 356. Raine, Psychopathy, Violence, and Brain Imaging, supra note 31, at 52; see also 
Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 157-
65 (2005) (arguing that the current system of retributive justice should be replaced 
with a rehabilitative and preventive regime that would be consistent with current and 
evolving scientific knowledge about human behavior and the deterministic 
viewpoint). 
 357. See SOMMERS & SATEL, supra note 350, at 77-109. 
 358. See Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of 
Punishment, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 627, 627-28 (2004) (stating that punishment is an 
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individuals accountable for their criminal conduct, and we resist 
ascribing immoral behavior to an uncontrollable brain dysfunction.359  
But “there is an important difference between being immoral and 
acting immoral.  A defendant who acts immorally as a result of 
[frontal lobe brain dysfunction] is arguably not as culpable as a 
defendant who simply is immoral.”360  In the age of science, we cannot 
ignore what neuroscience tells us about the causal role of brain 
dysfunction in criminal behavior. 
Indeed, evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction will continue to be 
introduced in American courtrooms to litigate a variety of pre-trial, 
adjudicatory, and dispositional issues in criminal cases.361  This trend 
is likely to accelerate, as the technologies available for diagnosing 
frontal lobe dysfunction improve, and as attorneys and courts 
become more familiar with, and receptive to, neuroscience evidence. 
In particular, modern neuroscience provides a basis for concluding 
that some criminal defendants with frontal lobe brain dysfunction 
lack culpability for their crimes.  Control tests for insanity must be 
available to ensure that these defendants have the opportunity to 
prove that they lacked criminal responsibility for the charged offense.  
A defendant with a limited physiological ability to control his or her 
criminal behavior should be allowed to present evidence of a lack of 
culpability due to impaired impulse control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
aspect of every legal system in the world and humans seem to instinctively punish 
wrongdoers); Greene & Cohen, supra note 347, at 223 (discussing studies suggesting 
that the instinct to punish may be “a crucial development in the biological and 
cultural evolution of human sociality . . . . driven by phylogenetically old mechanisms 
in the brain”).  Interestingly, research suggests that people with a high need for 
cognition (those who seek out and enjoy effortful cognitive activity) tend to be 
somewhat “less supportive of punitive responses to crime because they tend to 
generate more complex attributions for human behavior.”  Michael J. Sargent, Less 
Thought, More Punishment:  Need for Cognition Predicts Support for Punitive Responses to 
Crime, 30 P.S.P.B. 1485, 1490 (2004).  
 359. Jessie A. Seiden, Comment, The Criminal Brain:  Frontal Lobe Dysfunction 
Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 419 (2004). 
 360. Id. at 419 (emphasis in original). 
 361. See Richard E. Redding, Evidence of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Criminal Cases:  
Emerging Research and Caselaw (on file with author) (reviewing use of FLD evidence in 
cases involving issues of incompetence to stand trial, waivers of constitutional rights, 
sentencing, and  ineffective assistance of counsel).   
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APPENDIX A.  FORENSIC ASSESSMENT OF FRONTAL LOBE DYSFUNCTION 
(FLD) 
Many defendants who suffer from FLD fail to disclose any 
symptoms or that they had suffered a head injury,362 often because 
they lack insight that their behavior is maladaptive or socially 
inappropriate.  They also tend to present an unrealistically favorable 
image of themselves.363 Thus, defense attorneys must vigorously 
investigate the possibility of brain dysfunction and obtain diagnostic 
evaluations whenever they suspect (based on their interactions with 
the defendant, the defendant’s self-report of head injury or 
symptoms, medical records, or collateral reports from family, friends, 
or witnesses) that their client may have a brain disorder.  Attorneys 
often fail to do this, however.  For example, a recent 
neuropsychological study of eighteen youthful defendants on Texas’ 
death row found that although fifteen showed symptoms of FLD, only 
four had received a pretrial mental health evaluation (and these were 
incomplete evaluations).364 
To effectively represent a defendant with possible FLD, the 
attorney must obtain a competent and thorough neuropsychiatric 
assessment of the client.  While there are no published cases 
involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on an 
attorney’s failure to obtain a competent expert, an attorney using 
unqualified experts may be relying upon inaccurate or inadequately 
developed evidence.  Thus, “[a]ttorneys utilizing mental health 
expertise in criminal cases are well advised to review national and 
local standards of practice, ethical codes, and treatises pertaining to 
the effective monitoring of relevant assessment and reporting 
techniques.”365 
                                                 
 362. Damasio & Anderson, supra note 51, at 414, 425; see also Lewis et al., 15 Death 
Row Inmates, supra note 35, at 846; Cato et al., supra note 109, at 455 (reporting case 
of “a modern-day Phineas Gage,” in which the patient “reported that he did not have 
any cognitive or emotional problems”).  Indeed, the public is largely unaware of the 
psychological and neurological symptoms that may result from head injury.  See 
Jocelyn B. Aubrey, Allen R. Dobbs & Brendan Gail Rule, Laypersons’ Knowledge About 
the Sequelae of Minor Head Injury and Whiplash, 52 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY, & 
PSYCHIATRY 842 (1989) (reporting study results showing that laypeople failed to 
recognize that psychological and neurological problems could result from non-
serious head injuries). 
 363. Daniel Tranel, Acquired Sociopathy, supra note 106, at 290. 
 364. Lewis et al., Ethics Questions, supra note 66, at 425. 
 365. See generally Eric Y. Drogan, Jurisprudent Therapy, Ineffective Assistance, and Social 
Scientific Evidence, 4 BULL. L., SCI. & TECH. 4 (2002). 
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Like most forensic assessments, a competent assessment for FLD 
will include a collection of past medical and behavioral history and 
collateral source information, a psychiatric or neurological 
examination, neuropsychological testing, and perhaps 
electroencephalography (“EEG”) or neuroimaging.  Without a 
comprehensive examination, individuals with frontal lobe damage 
may go undiagnosed,366 particularly since those with FLD often fail to 
report any symptoms.367 Or, inadequate examinations may result in 
the misdiagnosis of FLD as true psychopathy or antisocial personality 
disorder,368 disorders that likely carry more negative consequences for 
the defendant.369  When used alone, neuroimaging or 
neuropsychological testing can overestimate, under-detect, or fail to 
detect the type and degree of brain damage present.370  Persons with 
FLD may score within the normal range on standard 
neuropsychological tests, even those designed to assess frontal lobe 
functioning.371 Importantly, once a diagnosis of FLD is made, the 
forensic clinician must then assess the relationship between the 
cognitive or behavioral symptoms of the dysfunction and their causal 
connection (if any) to the relevant legal capacities. 
Neuropsychological tests commonly used to assess frontal lobe 
functioning include the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (“WCST”)—a 
measure of cognitive flexibility and abstracting ability; the Sequential 
Matching Memory Test (“SMMT”)—a measure of the capacity to 
sustain attention; the Trail Making Test (“TMT”)—a measure of 
sequential processing and planning; the Stroop Interference Test—a 
measure of selective attention and response inhibition; the Iowa 
Gambling Task—a measure of real-life decision making under 
conditions of risk, reward, and punishment, the Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test (“AVLT”)—a measure of verbal memory; the Porteus 
Maze Test—a measure of advanced planning skills; and the Category 
Test of the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery (“HRNB”), 
among others.  Of these, the WCST and the SMMT are among the 
                                                 
 366. Knight & Stuss, supra note 38, at 587. 
 367. Damasio & Anderson, supra note 51, at 414, 425. 
 368. Pincus, Aggression and Frontal Lobes, supra note 6, at 553 (“A person can be a 
social imbecile because of frontal [lobe] damage and still have a normal IQ.”). 
 369. Lewis et al., Ethics Questions, supra note 66, at 425. 
 370. Erin D. Bigler, Neuropsychological Testing Defines the Neurobehavioral Significance 
of Neuroimaging-Identified Abnormalities, 16 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 227-
28 (2001). 
 371. See Brower & Price, supra note 35, at 721.  “You can be fooled into thinking, 
‘the IQ is fine, the neurologic exam is fine.’  Yet these patients are brain damaged.”  
Ely, supra note 95, at 3 (quoting Professor Kirk Daffner, a behavioral neurologist at 
Harvard University).   
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most sensitive and discriminating tests for frontal lobe damage.372  A 
variety of computer-based measures of executive function are 
currently under development that will likely replace the WCST and 
the Category Test.  A new method, the Delis-Kaplan Executive 
Function System,373 is perhaps the best currently available method for 
assessing executive functioning, particularly in forensic contexts. 
Neuroimaging technologies available for assessing frontal lobe 
functioning include the structural techniques of computerized axial 
tomography (“CAT”) and magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”).  
Functional techniques, used with the assistance of computer analysis 
programs, include Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(“FMRI”), Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”) and Single-
Photon Emission Computerized Tomography (“SPECT”).  Each 
technique differs in “sensitivity, precision, accuracy, and fidelity for 
the physiological process being measured.”374  An emerging practice is 
to conduct functional imaging while the patient is challenged with 
various neuropsychological tests and neurobehavioral probes that 
activate frontal lobe functioning.  “The successful implementation of 
neurobehavioral probes on line with neuroimaging will likely replace 
many of the current methods of neuropsychological assessment”.375 
Although neuroimaging can provide powerful visual evidence of 
FLD, the interpretation of imaging results is as much an art as a 
science.376  Results may differ over short time periods and as a 
function of the conditions under which the scan was taken. 
Differences in signal intensity and color coding of brain regions 
across scans may also produce markedly different images of brain 
functioning.  Thus, differentiating normal from abnormal imaging 
results can be difficult.  Scans that appear structurally normal do not 
necessarily indicate a lack of deficits, since diffuse axonal brain 
damage may affect behavior and yet be structurally undetectable, and 
functionally abnormal findings do not necessarily indicate organic 
pathology.  “The definition of normal is still more slippery in forensic 
evaluations in which the brain activity being evaluated is purported to 
relate to function or behavior.”377  Thus, imaging alone cannot 
                                                 
 372. See generally Bruce F. Pennington & Sally Ozonoff, Executive Functions and 
Developmental Psychopathology, 37 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 51 (1996) (providing 
comprehensive listing of tests for assessing executive and frontal lobe functioning). 
 373. See D. DELIS, E. KAPLAN & J. KRAMER, DELIS-KAPLAN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
SYSTEM MANUAL (2001). 
 374. Reeves et al., supra note 168, at 89. 
 375. Bigler, supra note 39, at 124. 
 376. Knight & Stuss, supra note 38, at 588. 
 377. Reeves et al., supra note 168, at 90. 
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establish a definitive relationship between brain functioning and 
criminal behavior or forensically relevant abilities.  “To date, a 
functional deviation shown by imaging has never been causally 
associated with an isolated, complex [criminal] behavior . . . .”378  
While a neuroimage can be helpful in the identification of brain 
injury,379 “[t]he behavioral effects of a neuroimaging-identified brain 
lesion can only be fully appreciated in the context of 
neuropsychological [testing],”380 which probably provides the best 
means for assessing frontal lobe functioning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 378. Id. at 94. 
 379. Kulynych, Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, supra note 72, at 239-43 (stating 
that neuroimaging is far more valid and useful in research studies than it is for 
diagnosing mental disorders in individual patients). 
 380. See Bigler, supra note 370, at 227-36. 
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APPENDIX B. STATES HAVING CONTROL TESTS FOR INSANITY. 
State 
 
Statute 
 
Operative Control Test 
Language 
Connecticut 
 
CONN GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-13(a) 
(West 2005) 
 
“In any prosecution for an 
offense, it shall be an affirmative 
defense that the defendant, at the 
time he committed the proscribed 
act or acts, lacked substantial 
capacity, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to control his conduct 
within the requirements of the law.” 
District of  
Columbia 
n/a 
 
In order to prevail in an insanity 
defense, the defendant must 
“prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, he lacked 
substantial capacity either to 
conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law or to ‘recognize’ the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.”  
Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 
75 (D.C. 1976). 
Georgia 
 
GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-3 (West 
2006) 
 
“A person shall not be found 
guilty of a crime when, at the time 
of the act, omission, or negligence 
constituting the crime, the person, 
because of mental disease, injury, 
or congenital deficiency, acted as he 
did because of a delusional compulsion 
as to such act which overmastered his 
will to resist committing the crime.” 
    Hawaii 
 
HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 704-400 
(Lexis Nexis 
2005). 
     “A person is not responsible, 
under this Code, for conduct if at 
the time of the conduct as a result 
of physical or mental disease, 
disorder, or defect the person 
lacks substantial capacity either to 
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 appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
person’s conduct or to conform the 
person’s conduct to the requirements of 
law.” 
Idaho 
 
n/a 
 
“[O]nce a defendant’s sanity is 
put in issue, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt either 
(1) that the defendant had no 
mental disease or defect at the 
time of the act, or (2) that, if such 
disease or defect existed, it did not 
cause a lack of substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law.”  State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 
804 (Idaho 1969). 
Iowa 
 
IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 701.4 (West 
1979) 
 
The irresistible impulse 
instruction “is limited to situations 
in which the defendant either was 
unable to comprehend the nature 
and consequences of the act or to 
know that the act was wrong . . . 
the record must also contain 
substantial evidence that the 
defendant’s illness was 
‘overpowering’ so that the 
defendant was ‘irresistibly forced’ 
to commit the act.”  State v. 
Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 185 
(Iowa 1979). 
Kentucky 
 
KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 504.020 
(West 2005). 
 
“A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct, as a result of mental 
illness or retardation, he lacks 
substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law.” 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., 
[CRIM. LAW] § 3-
109 (West 2005). 
“A defendant is not criminally 
responsible for criminal conduct 
if, at the time of that conduct, the 
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  defendant, because of a mental 
disorder or mental retardation, 
lacks substantial capacity to: (1) 
appreciate the criminality of that 
conduct; or (2) conform that conduct 
to the requirements of law.” 
Massachusetts 
 
n/a 
 
“A person is not responsible 
forcriminal conduct if at the time 
of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.”  Commonwealth 
v. McHoul, 226 N.E. 2d 556, 558 
(Mass. 1967). 
Michigan 
 
MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN.  
§ 768.21(a) 
(West 2005). 
 
“An individual is legally insane 
if, as a result of mental illness . . . 
or as a result of being mentally 
retarded . . . that person lacks 
substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the nature and quality 
or the wrongfulness of his or her 
conduct or to conform his or her 
conduct to the requirements of the law.” 
New Mexico 
 
N.M. STAT. 
ANN.  § 14-51-
01 (West 
2005). 
“The defendant was insane at 
the time of the commission of the 
crime if, because of a mental 
disease, as explained below, the 
defendant: did not know what [he] 
[she] was doing or understand the 
consequences of [his] [her] act, 
[or] did not know that [his] [her] 
act was wrong, [or] could not prevent 
[himself] [herself] from committing the 
act . . . .” 
Ohio 
 
n/a 
 
An accused is not guilty by 
reason of insanity if, “at the time of 
the criminal act, he did not know 
that such act was wrong or he did 
not have the ability to refrain from 
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doing that act.” State v. Anders, 277 
N.E.2d 554, 556 (Ohio 1972). 
Oregon 
 
OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 161.295 
(West 2005). 
 
“A person is guilty except for 
insanity if, as a result of mental 
disease or defect at the time of 
engaging in criminal conduct, the 
person lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality 
of the conduct or to conform the 
conduct to the requirements of law.” 
Rhode Island 
 
n/a 
 
“A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, his capacity 
either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law is so substantially impaired that 
he cannot justly be held responsible.”  
State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 
(R.I. 1979). 
Vermont 
 
VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 4801 
(2004). 
 
“A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he lacks adequate 
capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law.” 
Virginia 
 
n/a 
 
Virginia recognizes the 
irresistible impulse doctrine.  The 
defense is applicable only where 
the defendant’s mind has become 
“so impaired by disease that the 
accused is totally deprived of the 
mental power to control or restrain his 
or her acts.”  Godley v. Commonwealth, 
343 S.E.2d 368, 373 (Va. App. Ct. 
1986). 
West Virginia n/a “When a defendant in a 
criminal case raises the issue of 
insanity, the test of defendant’s 
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  responsibility for act is whether, at 
time of commission of act, the act 
was the result of a mental disease 
or defect causing the defendant to 
lack the capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his/her act or to conform his/her acts 
to the requirements of law.”  State v. 
Lockhart, 490 S.E.2d 298, 302 (W. 
Va. 1997). 
Wisconsin 
 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 971.15 (West 
2005) 
 
“A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect the person lacked 
substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
or her conduct or conform his or her 
conduct to the requirements of law.” 
Wyoming 
 
WYO. STAT. ANN.  
§ 7-11-304 
(1977). 
 
“A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of 
the criminal conduct, as a result of 
mental illness or deficiency, he 
lacked substantial capacity either 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law.” 
 
